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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-35-7.1(12), 63-46b-16 and 78-2a-
3(2). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. Whether the agency erroneously applied the law under 
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 
(1981), by concluding that respondent/appellee Loel D. Thometz 
(hereinafter "Thometz") proved his case based solely on a finding 
that he established a prima facie case. This issue was preserved 
in the administrative proceedings. See, e.g., Request for Formal 
Hearing dated March 9, 1994 at 1 (Record ("R.") at 20); Closing 
Argument dated November 14, 1994 at 2-6 (R. at 730-34); Industrial 
Commission's Order Denying Motion for Review at 2 (R. at 817) ; 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at 2, 3, 12 
(hereinafter "Order") (R. at 749, 750, 759). The agency's decision 
regarding a question of law is afforded no deference and is 
reviewed under a correction of error standard. Sheikh v. 
Department of Public Safety. 904 P.2d 1103, 1105 (Utah App. 1995) 
("When reviewing an agency's conclusion regarding a question of 
law, we accord the agency decision no deference, but review it for 
correctness."); Morton Int'l. Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah 
State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581, 589 (Utah 1991) (same). 
II. Whether substantial evidence supports the agency's 
determination that Thometz7 age was a determining factor in the 
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decision to include him in a reduction in force. This issue was 
preserved in the administrative proceedings. See, e.g., Motion for 
Review at 5-8 (R. at 765-68). The agency's findings of fact should 
be affirmed only if they are "'supported by substantial evidence 
and viewed in light of the whole record before the Court.'" Larson 
Limestone Co. v. State Div. of Oil, Gas & Mining. 903 P.2d 429, 430 
(Utah 1995) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (g)) . In 
reviewing whether the agency's findings are supported by 
substantial evidence, the Court must consider not only the evidence 
supporting the agency's factual findings, but also the evidence 
that fairly detracts from the weight of the agency's findings. 
Grace Drilling Co, v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 
1989) ; First Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 
1163, 1165 (Utah 1990). 
III. Whether substantial evidence supports the agency's 
conclusion that managements' ranking of Thometz below a coworker 
and lack of knowledge regarding his capacity in other areas created 
an inference of age discrimination. This issue was preserved in 
the administrative proceedings. See, e.g., Motion for Review at 7-
8 (R. at 766-67). The agency's findings of fact are reviewed under 
a substantial evidence standard. Larson Limestone Co. , 903 P.2d at 
430; Grace Drilling Co., 776 P.2d at 68; First Nat'l Bank, 799 P.2d 
at 1165. 
IV. Whether substantial evidence supports the agency's 
determination that informational notes of the PCC created an 
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inference of discrimination. This issue was preserved in the 
administrative proceedings. See, e.g.. Motion for Review at 5-6 
(R. at 765-66). The agency's findings of fact are reviewed under 
a substantial evidence standard. Larson Limestone Co., 903 P.2d at 
430; Grace Drilling Co.. 776 P.2d at 68; First Nat'l Bank. 799 P.2d 
at 1165. 
V. Whether substantial evidence supports the agency's 
conclusion that Thometz' co-workers supervisor made remarks related 
to his age. This issue was preserved in the Administrative 
Proceedings. See, e.g.. Motion for Review at 3 (R. at 763). The 
agency's findings of fact are reviewed under a substantial evidence 
standard. Larson Limestone Co., 903 P.2d at 430; Grace Drilling 
Co.. 776 P.2d at 68; First Nat'l Bank. 799 P.2d at 1165. 
VI. Whether the agency erred, as a matter of law, in 
determining that stray remarks, allegedly made by Thometz' co-
workers and supervisor, created an inference of discrimination. 
This issue was preserved in the administrative proceedings. See. 
e.g., Motion for Review at 4 (R. at 764). The agency's decision 
regarding a question of law is afforded no deference and is 
reviewed under a correction of error standard. Sheikh. 903 P.2d at 
1105; Morton Int'l, Inc.. 814 P.2d at 589. 
VII. Whether the agency erred in its reliance on 
statistical evidence which fails, as a matter of law, to support an 
inference that age actually played a role in the decision of 
Hercules to include Thometz in a reduction in force. This issue 
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was preserved in the administrative proceedings. See, e.g., Motion 
for Review at 1-3 (R. at 761-63). The agency's decision regarding 
a question of law is afforded no deference and is reviewed under a 
correction of error standard. Sheikh. 903 P.2d at 1105; Morton 
Int'l. Inc.. 814 P.2d at 589. 
VIII. Whether substantial evidence supports the 
agency's determination that the statistical evidence created an 
inference of discrimination. This issue was preserved in the 
administrative proceedings. See, e.g., Motion for Review at 1-3 
(R. at 761-63). The agency's findings of fact are reviewed under 
a substantial evidence standard. Larson Limestone Co.. 903 P.2d at 
430; Grace Drilling Co.. 776 P.2d at 68; First Nat'l Bank. 799 P.2d 
at 1165. 
IX. Whether the agency erred, as a matter of law, in 
determining that Thometz had no duty to mitigate his damages by 
making reasonable efforts to seek alternative employment. This 
issue was preserved in the administrative proceedings. See, e.g. , 
Motion for Review at 9 (R. at 7 69). The agency's decision 
regarding a question of law is afforded no deference and is 
reviewed under a correction of errors standard. Sheikh. 903 P.2d 
at 1105; Morton Int/1. Inc.. 814 P.2d at 589. 
X. Whether substantial evidence supports the agency's 
conclusion that Thometz mitigated his damages. This issue was 
preserved in the administrative proceedings. See, e.g.. Motion for 
Review at 9 (R. at 769). The agency's findings of fact are 
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reviewed under a substantial evidence standard. Larson Limestone 
Co, . 903 P.2d at 430; Grace Drilling Co.. 776 P.2d at 68; First 
Nat'l Bank, 799 P.2d at 1165. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The determinative statute in this case is Section 34-35-6 
of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, which provides in relevant 
part: 
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice: 
(a) (i) for an employer to . . . 
discharge, . . . terminate any 
person, . . . or discriminate in 
. . . terms, privileges, and 
conditions of employment against any 
person otherwise qualified, because 
of . • . age, if the individual is 
40 years of age or older . . . . 
* * * 
(4) . . . [E]xcept where age is a bona fide 
occupational qualification, no person shall be 
subject to involuntary termination . . . from 
employment on the basis of age alone, if the 
individual is 40 years of age or older. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6 (1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from an order of the Utah Industrial 
Commission affirming the decision of Administrative Law Judge 
Benjamin A. Sims in a discrimination proceeding under the Utah 
Anti-discrimination Act. The Commission denied Hercules' motion 
for review of the AU's decision that Thometz was terminated in 
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violation of Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6 (1989) , and adopted the 
findings and conclusions set forth in the ALJ's decision. 
II. COURSE OP THE PROCEEDINGS 
Thometz filed a charge of age discrimination against 
Hercules with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division ("UADD"), 
alleging that he was discriminated against on the basis of his age 
when he was included in a reduction in force in August, 1992. See 
Charge of Discrimination (R. at 1-3). Hercules responded by 
denying that it subjected Thometz to any age discrimination, and by 
pointing out that Hercules was undergoing a series of reductions in 
force due to a significant reduction in the level of its business 
and that Thometz' inclusion in the RIF was based on his ranked 
performance in the department in which he worked. See Response to 
Charge of Discrimination (R. at 4-6) . The UADD issued a 
determination finding reasonable cause to believe that Thometz was 
subjected to age discrimination. See UADD's Determination of 
Merits (R. at 10-15). Hercules requested and received a de novo 
evidentiary hearing on Thometz' charge. Request for Formal Hearing 
(R. at 18-49); Certification Granting Evidentiary Hearing (R. at 
55-57) . The evidentiary hearing was held on October 26 and 27, 
1994 before Administrative Law Judge Benjamin A. Sims. Transcript 
of Hearing (R. at 823-1162). 
III. DISPOSITION OP THE AGENCY 
On March 13, 1995, the administrative law judge issued an 
order finding that Thometz was terminated in violation of Utah Code 
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Ann. § 34-35-6. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (R. 
at 748-60) (attached hereto as Addendum "A"). Hercules then filed 
a motion with the Industrial Commission for review of the ALJ's 
decision. Motion for Review (R. at 761-91). On September 19, 
1995, the Commission issued an order denying Hercules' motion for 
review, affirming the ALJ's decision that Thometz was terminated in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6, and adopting the findings 
and conclusions set forth in the ALJ's decision. Order Denying 
Motion for Review (R. at 816-20) (attached hereto as Addendum "B") . 
IV. STATEMENT OP PACTS 
1. Thometz was born on July 13, 1937. Transcript of 
Evidentiary Hearing ("Transcript") at 9 (R. at 831). He was hired 
by appellant Alliant Techsystems, Inc., successor in interest to 
Hercules Incorporated ("Hercules"), in May 1984 as a Material 
Review Specialist. Transcript at 17 (R. at 839). At the time he 
was hired, Thometz was 46 years of age. Transcript at 68 (R. at 
890) . 
2. In May 1989, Thometz became a Senior Quality Control 
Inspector in the Manufacturing Quality Control ("MQC") Department 
of the Composite Structures Organization. Transcript at 71-72 (R. 
at 893-94). The Composite Structures Organization consists of two 
facilities: the High Tech Structures ("HTS") facility, and the 
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Specialty Structures facility.1 Transcript at 165, 169, 170 (R. 
at 987, 991-92). Thometz initially worked in the HTS facility. 
Transcript at 23 (R. at 845). 
3. In November 1991, Thometz moved to the Specialty 
Structures facility where he remained until he was terminated as 
part of a reduction in force on August 6, 1992. Transcript at 31 
(R. at 853) . 
4. Thometz' termination was the result of one of 
several reductions in force that Hercules was required to undergo 
due to drastic economic downturns in the aerospace and defense 
industries. Hercules' workforce was reduced by about 50 percent 
during this period of time. Transcript at 195 (R. at 1017); 
Closing Argument at 1 (R. at 729) . 
5. Rather than engage in random or seniority-based 
reductions in force, Hercules developed an extensive performance-
based lay-off system which required department managers to rank 
their employees by considering various factors, with job 
performance having the highest priority. Hercules Ex. 5 at Bates 
No. 000445 (R. at 214) . If performance and the other criteria were 
equal, then date of birth would be considered, with retention 
preference being granted to the senior aged employee. Id. (A copy 
of the RIF policy is attached hereto as Addendum "C"). 
1
 The Specialty Structures facility is also called the Composite Structures 
facility. Transcript at 169-70 (R. at 991-92). For consistency purposes, it 
will hereinafter be referred to as the Specialty Structures facility. 
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6. The lay off criteria in the RIF policy are stated, 
in order of priority, as follows: 
I. To assure retention of the best 
workforce, the criteria for selection of 
those individuals to be displaced will be 
in this order of priority: 
a. Job performance; 
b. Prior experience, including the 
individual's versatility and 
flexibility in terms of known and 
demonstrated performance on other 
functional responsibilities; 
c. Education applicable to the job; 
d. Relative ability; 
e. Physical limitations to performing a 
function other than that on which 
currently assigned (supported by 
medical documentation); 
f* Adjusted service date/then 
continuous service; 
If all of the above are equal -
g. Date of Birth (retention preference 
shall be granted to the senior aged 
employee). 
Hercules Ex. 5 at Bates No. 000445 (R. at 214) (emphasis added). 
7. In conjunction with the RIF policy, a corporate 
level Policy Compliance Committee ("PCC") was created. The mission 
statement for the PCC describes its purpose as: 
The HERCULES INCORPORATED Policy Compliance 
Committee (PCC) is established for the express 
purpose of assuring that the specific 
practices and procedures used to identify and 
select persons for separation are in 
compliance with Corporate policies and all 
234356 1 9 
applicable laws and regulations (including, 
but not limited to: EEO, ADEA, ERISA, COBRA, 
etc.). 
Hercules Ex. 5 at Bates No. 000443 (R. at 212); Transcript at 259-
60 (R. at 1081-82). The PCC consisted of three members: (1) a 
corporate employee relations representative, (2) a divisional human 
resources representative, and (3) legal counsel. Hercules' Ex. 5 
at Bates No. 000444 (R. at 213); Transcript at 263 (R. at 1085). 
8. The process for selecting employees for RIFs under 
the PCC policy is summarized as follows: 
(i) The local organization would first determine 
the need for a reduction in force, as well as the number and types 
of employees to be laid off. 
(ii) Department managers in the local organization 
would then rank their employees, based primarily on job 
performance. Potential was never a factor in the ranking decision. 
If performance and the other criteria were equal, the older 
employee would be retained. 
(iii) The local organization would then prepare a 
Personnel Displacement List, showing the employees in the order 
they were ranked. The goal was to ensure that the organization 
experiencing the RIF would be left with the best workforce 
available to achieve business requirements. 
(iv) After the Displacement lists were prepared, a 
meeting of the PCC would be held, during which the department 
managers would explain the basis of their RIF recommendations. The 
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PCC's responsibility was to assure that the specific practices and 
procedures used to identify and select individuals for the RIF were 
in compliance with corporate policy and all applicable laws and 
regulations. 
(v) If the PCC approved the RIF, the local 
organization would follow through in completing the RIF. However, 
if the PCC found that the written documentation and comments from 
management did not support the selection of a particular employee 
for a RIF, it would not approve the recommendation. Hercules Ex. 
5 at Bates No. 000442-48 (R. at 211-17) ; see also Transcript at 
259-69 (R. at 1081-91). 
9. In April, 1992, Lisa Hughes, who held the position 
of Quality Safety Manager for Specialty Structures facility, 
received a request from Human Resources to rank the employees in 
her department in preparation for a possible RIF. Transcript at 
187 (R. at 1009); Hercules Ex. 3 (R. at 106-110). Hughes was 
Thometz' manager in the Specialty Structures facility. Transcript 
at 32-33 (R. at 854-55). 
10. In accordance with the RIF policy, Hughes ranked the 
quality assurance non-exempt employees based primarily on job 
performance, considering her departmental needs at the time. 
Transcript at 197, 200-01 (R. at 1019, 1022-23). 
11. In ranking the employees, Hughes relied, to a large 
degree, on the opinion of Gerry Nuttal (then age 59) , the Quality 
Control ("QC") Supervisor who was directly responsible for 
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supervising Thometz and the other QC inspectors in the department. 
Transcript at 195-97, 221-22, 287-88 (R. at 1017-19, 1043-44, 1109-
10) . 
12. At Hughes' request, Nuttal ranked the employees in 
the Specialty Structures department. Transcript at 288 (R. at 
1110) . Based upon Thometz' job performance in the Specialty 
Structures facility, Nuttal ranked Thometz last among the six 
employees in the department. Transcript at 288-92 (R. at 1110-14). 
13. Nuttal and Hughes both believed that Thometz was the 
least valuable employee to the Specialty Structures department 
because he had a short tenure in the department, had limited 
exposure to other programs in that department and was essentially 
dedicated to a program that was ending, whereas the remaining 
employees had considerably more time in the department and were 
able to perform the duties on all the other programs. Transcript 
at 200, 208, 222-33, 289-92, 295-300 (R. at 1022, 1030, 1044-55, 
1111-14, 1117-22) . 
14. The ranking that Hughes submitted to, and which was 
reviewed and approved by, the PCC was exactly the same as Nuttal's 
ranking of those employees. Transcript at 288 (R. at 1110); 
Hercules Ex. 3 at Bates No. 000312 (R. at 107) . Hughes testified 
the ranking she presented to the PCC "resulted from my discussions 
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with Gerry Nuttal on how the indiv iduals were performing," 
Transcr ipt a t 197 (R. a t 1019).2 
15. Thometz t e s t i f i e d , in response to quest ioning by the 
ALJ, tha t he has no reason to be l ieve Nuttal ranked him l a s t among 
the employees in the department because of h i s age. Transcr ipt a t 
335 (R. a t 1157). 
16. Hughes t e s t i f i e d t ha t Thometz was ranked below Joe 
Garcia, who was placed j u s t ahead of Thometz, because she bel ieved 
t h a t , based on job performance in her department a t the time, 
Garcia had "exper t i se in a l l the programs we had going on," he had 
the " a b i l i t y to work well with h i s coworkers in the operat ions 
group," and he had performed "excel lent" on the Boeing Springs job . 
Transcr ipt a t 223-24 (R. a t 1045-46) .3 When asked i f age was a 
factor in ranking Thometz l a s t , Hughes t e s t i f i e d : 
Q: Was age a considerat ion when you ranked 
Mr. Thometz on the bottom? 
A: No. I never look a t age. I mean, most 
people in my department know tha t I am 
p a r t i c u l a r l y focused in one aspec t . And 
tha t i s performance because tha t i s what 
2
 Nuttal t e s t i f i e d tha t he and Hughes "would each make a l i s t , and then we 
would put them together and view them and see how they compared. And if there 
was a discrepancy between the two, then we would work tha t out among ourselves 
and debate the issue as to why one was rated higher or lower than the other based 
on the guideline t h a t ' s been es tabl i shed." Transcript a t 300 (R. a t 1122). 
3
 Hughes a lso t e s t i f i e d she f e l t tha t Thometz appeared t o have personal i ty 
conf l ic t s with other employees in the department. Transcript a t 225 (R. at 
1047). She further t e s t i f i e d tha t Thometz' performance was lacking in certain 
respects , t e s t i fy ing tha t on one occasion, Thometz performed an incorrect 
inspection of a B-22F fuselage which should have taken him, a t the most, 1-1/2 
hours to 2 hours but which took him about 6 hours. Transcript a t 225-26 (R. at 
1047-48). 
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we have a job t o perform, and what I am 
able t o achieve out of the indiv idual 
people i s going t o be most valuable t o 
the company and to my department and t o 
me in functioning with other departments. 
Transcript at 223-24 (R. at 1045-46) . 
17. Hughes did not consider Thometz' 1991 Performance 
Appraisal Report ("PAR"), which was prepared by Thometz' manager in 
the HTS f a c i l i t y , t o be comparable to Garcia's 1991 PAR because: 
[Thometz] wasn't working in my department that 
year [1991] . So t h e r e ' s not a d i r e c t 
comparison. You have two d i f f e r e n t 
supervisors providing eva luat ions , okay. What 
at l e a s t I would imagine i s you would have one 
supervisor or manager evaluat ing two 
ind iv idua l s , not two managers evaluat ing two 
d i f f e r e n t ind iv iduals and try ing t o make a 
d i r e c t comparison. What I was basing, you 
know, my evaluat ions on during the time 
[Thometz] was in there was on h i s performance 
in my department for the work that we were 
conducting, not what he was doing at HTS and 
not the type of work he was doing at HTS. I 
was looking at what my needs were. 
Transcript at 2 08 (R. at 1030) .4 Hughes was a l s o a "much s t r i c t e r 
evaluator and harder evaluator" than Thometz' manager in the HTS 
f a c i l i t y . Transcript at 206 (R. 1028). 
18. John Bai ley , Hercules' Director of Human Resources 
for the Composite Products Group, t e s t i f i e d without contradic t ion 
4
 Thometz' 1991 PAR only covered his work in the HTS f a c i l i t y . Transcript 
at 81 (R. at 903). He did not have a PAR after transferr ing to the Specia l ty 
Structures f a c i l i t y and has no idea what h is PAR would have been in that 
f a c i l i t y . Transcript at 81, 83 (R. at 903, 905). Gerry Nuttal , as the QC 
Supervisor, would have been responsible for preparing a PAR on Thometz in the 
Spec ia l ty Structures f a c i l i t y . Transcript at 303-04 (R. at 1125-26). On a sca le 
of -needs improvement" to "competent- to "outstanding," Nuttal t e s t i f i e d he would 
have rated Thometz "somewhere between needs improvement and competent." 
Transcript at 303-04 (R. at 1125-26). 
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that the supervisor's personal observations, rather than 
comparisons of PARs, were considered the most reliable indications 
of job performance in ranking employees for potential RIFs. 
Transcript at 272, 279-80 (R. at 1094, 1101-02). Regarding PAR 
comparisons, Baily testified: 
[T]he PAR cannot be the overall riding factor 
because PARs can be different. You can have a 
different supervisor rate a different 
employee. An employee might be in a different 
job category or a different job grade and may 
have different dimensions on their PAR. 
Transcript at 261-62 (R. at 1083-84). 
19. The only witnesses, other than Thometz himself, who 
stated that Thometz was superior to Garcia were two ex-employees 
and coworkers of Thometz in the HTS facility, Charles Walker and 
Daniel Vilart, and Thometz' former manager in the HTS facility, 
Larry Bradford. Transcript at 114, 137, 153 (R. at 936, 959, 975); 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at 10 (R. at 757). 
20. Walker has been a close social friend of Thometz 
since 1984. Transcript at 123 (R. at 945). He testified that he 
did not have "responsibility to rate [Thometz] or give him his 
performance reports," that he never evaluated the performance of 
any other inspectors in the Specialty Structures department, that 
he had very little opportunity to observe Thometz' work in the 
Specialty Structures department, and that his subjective opinions 
of Thometz and Garcia were based on as little as five minutes of 
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i n t e r a c t i o n every two days. Transcript at 107# 109, 122-23 (R. at 
929, 931, 944-45) . 
21 . V i lar t was RIF'ed at the same time as Thometz, in 
August 1992, and he thereaf ter f i l e d an age d iscr iminat ion charge 
against Hercules which was dismissed by the Industr ia l Commission. 
Transcript at 158 (R. at 980) . He t e s t i f i e d that he had no 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to evaluate any of the MQC inspec tors , that he never 
worked in the Spec ia l ty Structures f a c i l i t y , that he had no idea 
what work Thometz and the other inspectors in the Spec ia l ty 
Structures f a c i l i t y were doing, and that he did not know whether 
one job function in that f a c i l i t y was more valuable than another. 
Transcript at 153, 156-57 (R. at 975, 978-79) . 
22. Larry Bradford, Thometz' former manager in the HTS 
f a c i l i t y , t e s t i f i e d he would g ive Thometz a "s l ight edge11 over 
Garcia. Transcript at 137 (R. at 959) . He acknowledged, however, 
that t h i s opinion was based s o l e l y on Thometz' work in the HTS 
f a c i l i t y , that he had no supervisory authori ty over any of the MQC 
inspectors in the Spec ia l ty Structures f a c i l i t y , and that he had no 
bas i s to evaluate Thometz' value to the company in the Spec ia l ty 
Structures f a c i l i t y . Transcript at 138-39 (R. at 960-61) . 5 
5
 Despi te h i s " s l i g h t edge" tes t imony, Bradford s igned G a r c i a ' s 1989 PAR 
i n the HTS which shows 6 ou t s t and ing rankings and 8 competent r a n k i n g s , whereas 
Thometz' 1989 PAR in the HTS f a c i l i t y , a l s o s igned by Bradford, shows only 4 
ou t s t and ing rankings and 11 competent r ank ings . Thometz' Ex. 2 at pp. 26-38 (R. 
a t 306-18) ; Thometz' Ex. 5 a t pp 1-9 (R. a t 344-52) ; T r a n s c r i p t a t 73-79 (R. a t 
895-901). 
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23. The ranking list for the Specialty Structures 
facility, showing Thometz last among the quality assurance non-
exempt employees in his department, was presented, reviewed and 
approved by the PCC on April 21, 1992. Transcript at 243, 265-66 
(R. at 1065, 1087-88). 
24. Contained in the ranking sheets presented to the PCC 
members are notations reflecting the age, sex and race/national 
origin of employees in Thometz' department. See Hercules Ex. 3 at 
Bates No. 000312 (R. 107) . John Bailey, who was present during the 
PCC meeting, testified as follows regarding these notations: 
That's put on there for the PCC's information, 
because, as, you'll remember if you'll go back 
to the mission statement of the PCC, it said 
we must be in compliance with all laws. And 
so the PCC wanted to be aware of any adverse 
action that they may be taking. The want to 
know who's female and who's minority. It does 
not enter into their judgment or their 
decisions to approve a RIF. 
Transcript at 264 (R. at 1086). See also Transcript at 275 (the 
notations were "placed there to provide information to the members 
of the PCC of those people in protected groups so that they could 
comply with the laws"). (R. at 1097). 
25. After Thometz' lay-off on August 6, 1992, he worked 
as a salesman for Blaine Jensen RV sales for approximately one 
year, from October 1992 through October 1993. Transcript at 62 (R. 
at 884) . Thometz quit his job at Blaine Jensen because, according 
to his testimony, "they moved their office clear up to Kaysville, 
their store. And I didn't want to drive up to Kaysville in the 
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middle of the winter because that's the slow months." Transcript 
at 62 (R. at 884). 
26. Thometz did not begin searching for employment 
comparable to his job at Hercules until approximately July of 1994, 
nearly two years after he was laid off. Transcript at 85. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The ALJ erroneously applied the law by concluding that 
Thometz proved his case based solely on a finding that he 
established a prima facie case. The ALJ failed to make a finding 
with respect to whether Hercules met its burden of showing that the 
reasons for including Thometz in the RIF, a severe economic 
downturn in its business and his ranked performance, were 
legitimate and nondiscriminatory. Nor did the ALJ make a finding 
with respect to whether Thometz proved that Hercules' reasons were 
a pretext for intentional age discrimination. As a result of this 
legal error, the ALJ's decision must be overturned. 
The ALJ's ruling should also be reversed because his 
factual finding that Thometz was included in the RIF due to his age 
is not supported by substantial evidence. Based on Thometz' 
performance in the Specialty Structures facility, Thometz was 
ranked last among the employees in the department. The ranking list 
was then presented, reviewed and approved by the PCC, whose sole 
function was to ensure that the selection process complied with 
company policy and discrimination law. Incredibly, the ALJ 
completely overlooked Thometz' testimony that his supervisor, whose 
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ranking of Thometz was the same as the one approved by the PCC, was 
not biased against him because of his age. 
Rather than address the issue of intentional age 
discrimination, the ALJ did nothing more than second-guess 
Hercules' business judgment. Relying on the testimony of two ex-
employees and Thometz' former supervisor in another department, 
none of whom had any supervisory authority over Thometz in the 
Specialty Structures facility, the ALJ substituted his judgment for 
Hercules' management and determined that Thometz should have been 
ranked ahead of the next employee to be RIF'ed in the Specialty 
Structures facility. The ALJ also erroneously found that notations 
on the ranking sheets presented to the PCC, reflecting the sex, 
age, and race/national origin of certain employees, created an 
inference of age discrimination. The evidence was undisputed that 
these notations were simply for informational purposes so that the 
PCC could do its job of preventing potential discrimination against 
employees in protected categories. 
The ALJ also erred by determining that stray remarks, 
allegedly made by Thometz' manager and co-workers, created an 
inference of age discrimination. Alleged comments of this type are 
not, as a matter of law, probative of discrimination. The 
statistical analysis in the ALJ's decision is also flawed because 
it fails, as a matter of law, to support any inference that age 
actually played a role in the decision to include Thometz in the 
RIF. Finally, the agency's ruling on mitigation of damages is 
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erroneous. The evidence is clear that Thometz failed to satisfy 
his obligation to seek comparable alternative employment for nearly 
two years after his RIF. 
ARGUMENT 
I . THE AGENCY ERRED, AS A MATTER OP LAW, BY CONCLUDING THAT 
THOMETZ PROVED HIS CASE BASED SOLELY ON A FINDING THAT HE 
ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE. 
Claims under the Utah A n t i - D i s c r i m i n a t i o n Act a r e s u b j e c t 
t o t he same burden of proof scheme used i n T i t l e VII and ADEA 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c a s e s . Sheikh, 903 P.2d a t 1106 ( c i t i n g , among 
o t h e r c a s e s , McDonnell Douglas Corp. v . Green, 411 U.S. (1973) and 
Texas Dep ' t of Community A f f a i r s v . Burdine. 450 U.S. 248 (1981)) . 
To prove a prima facie case of age d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n a RIF con t ex t , 
Thometz had the burden t o show: 
(1) [He] was w i th in the p r o t e c t e d age group; 
(2) [He] was adve r se ly a f f e c t e d by the 
employment d e c i s i o n ; (3) [He] was q u a l i f i e d 
for the p o s i t i o n a t i s s u e ; and (4) [He] was 
t r e a t e d l e s s favorab ly than younger employees 
dur ing the r e d u c t i o n in f o r c e . 
Rea v . Mart in M a r i e t t a Corp. . 29 F.3d 1450, 1454 (10th C i r . 1994) .* 
6
 Hercules assumes t h a t Thometz s a t i s f i e d the f i r s t t h r e e elements of a 
prima f a c i e case , but c o n t e s t s the ALJ's conclusion t h a t he s a t i s f i e d the fourth 
element . As demonstrated below m Sect ion I I hereof, i n f r a , Thometz f a i l e d to 
prove he was t r e a t e d l e s s favorably than younger employees dur ing the RIF. 
Because Thometz was unable t o s a t i s f y the four th element of a prima f a c i e case, 
h i s evidence f a i l e d and h i s claim should have been d i smissed . See Jones v. 
Unisys Corporat ion, 829 F. Supp. 1281, 1285 (D. Utah 1993) . Moreover, even 
assuming t h a t Thometz e s t a b l i s h e d the four th element of a prima f a c i e case , he 
f a i l e d t o s a t i s f y h i s burden of proving t h a t Hercules' l eg i t imate , 
nondisc r imina to ry reasons for inc lud ing him in the RIF were a pretext for 
i n t e n t i o n a l age d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . 
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Once Thometz established a prima facie case, "the burden 
shi f t [ed] to [Hercules] to art iculate a legit imate non-
discriminatory reason for the adverse employment decis ion." Id. 
After Hercules articulated i t s legitimate non-discriminatory 
reasons, the burden shifted back to Thometz "to show that 
[Hercules7] proffered reasons were a pretext for discrimination." 
Id. at 1455. Proof of pretext alone, i . e . , that Hercules' reasons 
are fa l se , i s not enough. As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S. Ct. 2742 
(1993), a given reason "cannot be proved to be 'a pretext for 
discrimination' unless i t i s shown both that the reason was fa l se , 
and that discrimination was the real reason." Id. at 2752; see 
also Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1123 (7th 
Cir. 1994) ("a p la in t i f f i s not ent i t led to judgment as a matter of 
law simply because she proves her prima facie case and shows that 
the employer's proffered reasons for her discharge are f a l s e . " ) . 
Thus, Thometz not only had the burden to make a prima facie case 
but also to present "specific facts s igni f icant ly probative to 
support an inference that [Hercules'] proffered jus t i f i ca t ions were 
a pretext for discrimination." Martin Marietta. 29 F.3d at 1455.7 
7
 To s a t i s f y t h a t burden, a - p l a i n t i f f may not r e l y simply upon h i s prima 
facie evidence but must, i n s t e a d , i n t roduce a d d i t i o n a l evidence of age 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . - Manzer v . Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co . , 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 
(6th C i r . 1994)) ; Kraemer v . Edward Kraemer & Sons, I n c . , 783 F. Supp. 1040, 1045 
n .3 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (MThe Court f inds as not we l l taken P l a i n t i f f ' s argument 
that ' [ i jnasmuch as P l a i n t i f f Kraemer has p re sen ted a prima facie case under the 
[ADEA], Defendants Motion should be d e n i e d . ' . . . [A] p l a i n t i f f may not proceed 
beyond a w e l l - s t a t e d motion for summary judgment merely by r e s t i n g on i t s prima 
facie s h o w i n g . - ) . 
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In his Order, the ALJ simply discussed the burden-
shifting scheme and then found that Thometz established a prima 
facie case. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
(hereinafter "Order") at 2-3, 12 (R. at 749-50, 759). The ALJ's 
Order is devoid of (1) any finding that Hercules articulated 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for Thometz' layoff, and (2) 
any finding that Thometz satisfied his burden of proving that such 
reasons were a pretext for intentional age discrimination. See 
Order at 12 (R. at 759) . In other words, the ALJ's conclusion that 
Thometz was terminated in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6 was 
based solely on his finding that Thometz established a prima facie 
case. 
If a plaintiff is not automatically entitled to judgment 
as matter of law by merely proving a prima facie case and showing 
that the employer's reasons for the adverse employment action are 
false, see Hicks. 113 S.Ct. at 2749-52; Anderson. 13 F.3d at 1123, 
a fortiori Thometz should not prevail in this case based solely on 
a finding that he established a prima facie case. Here, instead of 
proceeding to the second and third steps of the burden-shifting 
scheme as the law requires, the ALJ mistakenly stopped at the prima 
facie stage. There is no way to tell if the ALJ's mistaken 
application of the law improperly influenced his ultimate factual 
finding that Thometz was terminated in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 34-35-6. As one court put it, " [i]f the bare bones elements of 
a plaintiff's prima facie were sufficient to make [a case of age 
discrimination] . . . , the entire 'burden shifting' analysis of 
McDonnell Douglas and its successors would be illusory." Manzor. 
29 F.3d at 1084. 
In sum, the ALJ erroneously applied the law under the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis by concluding that 
Thometz proved his case based solely on a finding that he 
established a prima facie case. Accordingly, the ALJ's Order must 
be overturned. 
II. THE AGENCY'S DETERMINATION THAT THOMETZ WAS TERMINATED IN 
VIOLATION OP UTAH CODE ANN. §34-35-6 IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
A. Hercules' Reasons for Including Thometz in a RIF 
Were Legitimate and Nondiscriminatory. 
Although the ALJ's Order does not address the issue, 
Hercules clearly satisfied its burden of articulating legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Thometz. Hercules 
submitted extensive evidence that its intent was to create a fair, 
nondiscriminatory method for selecting employees for reductions in 
force. Instead of implementing a random or seniority-based 
procedure, Hercules designed a rigorous and extensive performance-
based lay-off system which required department managers to rank 
their employees by considering, in order of priority, job 
performance; prior experience, including versatility and 
flexibility; job related education; relative ability and adjusted 
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service states and continuous service. Facts 1 5. If job 
performance and the other factors were equal, then retention 
preference would be granted to the senior aged employee. Id. This 
procedure was subject to review by the Policy Compliance Committee 
("PCC"), whose sole function was to insure that each RIF decision 
was based upon nondiscriminatory business reasons. Facts 11 7-8. 
As stated in the ALJ's Order, due to a severe economic 
conditions, Hercules was required to significantly down size its 
workforce during the time period when Thometz was laid off: 
[Hercules] has undergone a number of 
reductions in force which were necessitated by 
the drastic economic downturn of the aerospace 
and defense industries. Since October 1990, 
the Hercules' Bacchus Works, the facility at 
issue in this case, has reduced its workforce 
by approximately 1800 employees. [Thometz] 
was laid off in August 1992 as a result of one 
of those reductions in force. Faced with a 
significantly declining business base, 
Hercules had no choice, but to reduce the size 
of its workforce. Rather than do this 
randomly, Hercules designed and implemented an 
extensive weigh-off system which it claims 
maintained the skills it needed without 
discriminating against any protected class of 
employees. 
Order at 2 (R. at 749.) 
The economic need to reduce its workforce and the 
nondiscriminatory procedure which Hercules implemented in carrying 
out the RIF are the same legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons which 
the Tenth Circuit upheld in Martin Marietta: 
Defendant advanced the following two 
legitimate nondiscriminatory justifications 
for Plaintiff's layoff: (1) economic 
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conditions within the aerospace industry 
dictated mass layoffs, and (2) lay-off 
decisions were based on departmental rankings 
and Plaintiff was ranked at the bottom of her 
labor grade. 
Martin Marietta, 29 F.3d at 1455 (footnote omitted). 
Just like the plaintiff in Martin Marietta. Thometz was 
RIF'ed because of a severe downturn in Hercules' business and 
because of his low ranking in the department in which he worked. 
Thometz' manager and supervisor both believed that he was the least 
valuable employee to the Specialty Structures department because he 
had a short tenure in the department, had limited exposure to other 
programs in that department and was essentially dedicated to a 
program that was ending, whereas the remaining employees had 
considerable more time in the department and were able to perform 
the duties on all other programs. Facts 1 13. 
At the request of the department manager, Lisa Hughes, 
Thometz' supervisor, Gerry Nuttal, ranked the employees in the 
Specialty Structures department and determined that Thometz should 
be ranked last. Facts 1 12. Hughes testified the ranking she 
presented to the PCC "resulted from my discussion with Gerry Nuttal 
on how the individuals were performing." Facts 1 14. 
Significantly, Thometz admitted he had no reason to believe that 
Nuttal ranked him last among the employees in the department 
because of his age. Facts 1 15. Under these circumstances, 
Thometz clearly failed to satisfy his burden of proving that 
Hercules' reason for including him in the RIF, his low ranking in 
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the department, was a pretext for intentional age discrimination. 
Accordingly, the ALJ's Order is not supported by substantial 
evidence and should be overturned. 
B. The ALJ Improperly Second-Guessed Hercules' 
Business Judgment. 
The ALJ side-steps the issue of intentional age 
discrimination and second-guesses Hercules' business judgment. 
Ignoring the reasons articulated by Thometz' manager and supervisor 
for his inclusion in the RIF, the ALJ relied instead on the 
testimony of two ex-employees, who were coworkers of Thometz in the 
HTS facility, and Thometz' former manager in the HTS, who had no 
supervisory authority over Thometz in the Specialty Structures 
facility. Based on this testimony, the ALJ concluded that Thometz 
was ranked incorrectly below the next employee to be RIF'ed in the 
Specialty Structures facility, Joe Garcia. See Order at 10 (R. at 
757) . 
A close examination of the record reveals that the ALJ's 
second-guessing of Hercules' business judgment is not supported by 
substantial evidence. Charles Walker, a close personal friend and 
coworker of Thometz in the HTS facility, never had any 
"responsibility to rate [Thometz] or give him his performance 
reports" or to evaluate the performance of the other inspectors in 
the Specialty Structures department, had very little opportunity to 
observe Thometz' work in the Specialty Structures facility, and 
interacted with the inspectors in the Specialty Structures facility 
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for as little as five minutes every two days. Pacts 1 20. Daniel 
Vilart, who was RIF'ed in August 1992 and filed an age 
discrimination charge, had no responsibility to evaluate any of the 
MQC inspectors, never worked in the Specialty Structures facility, 
had no idea what work Thometz and the other inspectors in that 
facility were doing, and did not know whether one job function in 
that facility was more valuable than another. Facts 1 21. 
Thometz' former supervisor in the HTS facility, Larry 
Bradford, testified he would give Thometz "a slight edge" over 
Garcia. Facts 1 22. However, Bradford acknowledged his "slight 
edge" opinion was based solely on Thometz' work in HTS facility, 
that he had no supervisory authority over the MQC inspectors in the 
Specialty Structures facility, and that he had no basis to evaluate 
Thometz' value to the company in the Specialty Structures facility. 
Facts 1 22. 
The ALJ's second-guessing of Hercules' ranking of the 
employees in the Specialty Structures facility and his belief that 
it was not an accurate reflection of Thometz' abilities does not 
permit a conclusion that the ranking was a pretext for age 
discrimination. As the Tenth Circuit reasoned in Fallis v. Kerr-
McGee Corp.. 944 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1991): 
The trouble with these arguments is that they 
are merely general disagreements with [the 
employer's] evaluation of which [employees] 
are best able to guide the company through a 
difficult economic time. Under the law of 
this circuit, even if the jury chooses to 
believe plaintiff's assessment of his 
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performance rather than This employer's! . that 
choice, standing alone, does not permit a 
conclusion that Tthe employer's! version was a 
pretext for age discrimination. 
Id. at 747 (emphasis added) . See also Branson v. Price River Coal 
Co. . 853 F.2d 768, 772 (10th Cir. 1988) ("As courts are not free to 
second guess an employer's business judgment, this assertion [that 
plaintiff was equally or more qualified than the people retained] 
is insufficient to permit a finding of pretext."). 
A particularly egregious example of the ALJ substituting 
his judgment for that of Hercules' management is his conclusion 
that Thometz was superior to Garcia based on a finding that 
Thometz' "work history [shows] he was capable of performing more 
varied types of duties than was Mr. Garcia." Order at 10 (emphasis 
added) (R. at 757). Contrary to the ALJ's finding, Hercules' RIF 
policy expressly states that " [p]otential is never a factor in 
these displacement decisions." Hercules Ex. 5 at Bates No. 000446 
(emphasis added) (R. at 215). Management's decision to rank 
Thometz below Garcia was based on Thometz' perceived value to the 
Specialty Structures department at that time, not on what he may 
have been "capable" of doing at a later date or in other 
departments. This decision was in full compliance with company RIF 
policy. The fact that management relied on their own personal 
observations of Thometz while working in their department, rather 
than looking at Thometz' past experience in another department as 
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the A U did, is simply insufficient to support a finding of 
intentional age discrimination. 
The law only requires that RIF decisions be age neutral, 
not that they be "objective" or make sense to all outside 
observers. See EEOC v. Flasher Co. , 986 F.2d 1312, 1319 (10th Cir. 
1992) ("The law does not require, nor could it ever realistically 
require, employers to treat all of their employees all of the time 
in all matters with absolute, antiseptic, hindsight equality."); 
Sullivan v. Standard Chlorine of Delaware, 845 F. Supp. 167, 177 
(D. Del. 1994) ("The fact that [a manager] may have asserted his 
subjective views of the candidates' skills into the selection 
process does not, by itself, create a material issue of fact as to 
whether [plaintiff] was terminated for discriminatory reasons."). 
The ALJ also relied on the fact that Thometz worked in 
the "closed" area of the Specialty Structures facility to support 
his finding that Thometz was superior to Garcia. Not only does the 
ALJ's reliance on this fact improperly second-guess Hercules' 
business judgment, but it is also factually incorrect. The 
"closed" area was simply a security clearance designation that the 
government or customer put on the program. Transcript at 133, 135 
(R. at 955, 957) . The assignment of an employee to work in the 
closed area was simply a management decision, assuming the employee 
had the necessary security clearance. Transcript at 160 (R. at 
982) . An employee assigned by management to the "open" side of the 
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facility could be as or more qualified than an employee assigned to 
the "closed" side. Transcript at 160 (R. at 982). 
The ALJ also referred to "testimony about the relative 
merits and performance ratings of [Thometz] and compared to Mr. 
Garcia." Order at 9 (R. at 756). What the ALJ fails to note, 
however, is that the testimony was uncontroverted that the 
supervisor's personal observations, as opposed to comparisons of 
written PARs, are considered the most reliable indications of job 
performance in ranking employees for potential RIFs. Facts 1 18. 
PAR comparisons are inherently flawed because PARs were intended to 
assess the performance of an individual and his particular job 
duties at a given time in a particular department; they were not 
designed to compare one employee's performance to another 
employee's performance in a different department with a different 
supervisor. Id. Thus, Thometz' 1991 PAR, his last at Hercules, is 
not at all comparable to Garcia's 1991 PAR because it was completed 
by a different manager in a different department. Facts 1 17. 
Also, the manager who completed Thometz' 1991 PAR (Bradford) tended 
to give higher scores than the manager who completed Garcia's 1991 
PAR (Hughes). Id. 
In sum, the ALJ's Order is not supported by substantial 
evidence and does nothing more than second-guess the business 
judgment of Hercules' management. Therefore, the Order should be 
reversed. 
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C. Informational Notes Provided to the PCC Do Not 
Create an Inference of Age Discrimination. 
The ALJ found that notations on the ranking sheets 
presented to the PCC reflecting the age, sex and race/national 
origin of certain employees "tends to bolster the view that 
improper factors were being considered." Order at 8 (R. at 755). 
The fact that the notations exist, without more, does not support 
the conclusion drawn by the ALJ that improper factors were being 
considered. In fact, the evidence is undisputed that the notations 
were simply for informational purposes so that the PCC members 
could perform their job of assuring that minorities, females and 
older employees were not being improperly affected by the ranking 
process. Facts 1 24. 
The ALJ states that "no member of the PCC testified as to 
what he or she meant by the notations." Order at 8 (R. at 755). 
However, Julia Bench (who is responsible for all internal placement 
at Hercules and who was present during the PCC meeting) testified 
that she made notations on one of the ranking sheets, and that the 
notations were simply for informational purposes. Transcript at 
241-42 (R. at 1063-64); Hercules' Ex. 3 at Bates No. 000312 (R. at 
107) . 
The ALJ's statement "there was no evidence that the PCC 
ever found that any employee was placed on the list in violation of 
guidelines" is also inaccurate. See Order at 8 (R. at 755). John 
Bailey, Hercules' Director of Human Resources for the Composite 
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Products Group, testified the PCC has in fact refused to authorize 
RIFs proposed by department managers, in which case other 
individuals were selected. Transcript at 265 (R. at 1087). 
The ALJ's misguided analysis of the PCC issue is perhaps 
best summarized by Commissioner Thomas R. Carlson who, in a 
concurring opinion to the Commission's Order, stated: 
I disagree with the ALJ's finding that 
Hercules' Policy Compliance Committee (PCC) 
should have, in effect, left a blank record of 
its activities. It seems to this writer that 
the PCC did exactly what it was supposed to do 
in providing a road block to any potential 
discriminatory act on the part of those 
involved in the initial reduction-in-force 
selection process. 
To view the PCC activity as somehow 
impermissible turns a beneficial process 
upside down and dangerously makes wrong out of 
right. 
Order Denying Motion for Review at 4 (R. at 819). 
D. The Agency Erred, As a Matter of Law, in 
Determining That Stray Remarks, Allegedly Made By 
Thometz' Co-Workers and Manager, Created an 
Inference of Discrimination. 
The ALJ found that during a discussion with Thometz in 
which he had complained about the burden of lifting various heavy 
items, Lisa Hughes made the statement, "let the younger guys" do 
that work. Order at 6 (R. at 753) . The ALJ went on to find Hughes 
made this statement "out of concern for [Thometz] and out of 
concern for his safety" and "[t]here can certainly be no argument 
against her intent in this instance." Id. Hughes testified she 
did not recall the alleged remark, but that if it was made, it was 
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simply "for safety reasons to get help from another individual." 
Transcript at 326 (R. at 1148). The alleged comment was nothing 
more than a normal response to Thometz' request for help. 
Nevertheless, the ALJ concluded that the alleged comment "while not 
dispositive of this case is some evidence as to how [Thometz] was 
viewed by Ms. Hughes at least on the day and time of the 
utterance." Order at 6 (R. at 753). 
What the ALJ did not find, however, is any causal nexus 
between the alleged comment and the decision to include Thometz in 
the RIF. Even assuming Hughes made the alleged statement, the 
decision to terminate him was not that of Hughes' alone. She 
consulted with Gerry Nuttal, who Thometz does not believe 
discriminated against him, and she thereafter submitted their 
agreed upon ranking to the PCC which made the ultimate decision to 
include Thometz in the RIF. 
Comments much more egregious than Hughes' alleged 
statement have been found by the courts to be merely "stray 
remarks," not probative of discrimination. See, e.g.. Merrick v. 
Farmers Ins. Group. 892 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir. 1990) (single 
isolated comment by plaintiff's immediate supervisor that he chose 
an employee other than plaintiff because he was a "bright, 
intelligent, knowledgeable young man" was a stray remark and not 
sufficient to show discrimination); Bolton v. Scrivner. 36 F.3d 
939, 944 (10th Cir. 1994) ("[C]omments by Bolton's supervisor that 
Bolton was an 'old fart' do not show pretext because Bolton failed 
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to demonstrate a nexus between those comments and Scrivner's 
decision not to rehire him."); Cone v. Lonomont United Hosp. Ass.. 
14 F.3d 526, 531 (10th Cir. 1994) (statement of hospital's CEO that 
plaintiffs were terminated because hospital "need[s] some young 
blood" and "long-term employees have a diminishing return" were 
stray remarks which were "insufficient to show the hospital was 
motivated by discriminatory reasons."). 
As the foregoing case law demonstrates, the ALJ erred, as 
a matter of law, by concluding that Hughes' alleged stray remark 
created an inference of discrimination. In light of the ALJ's own 
findings that the alleged statement was made "out of concern for 
[Thometz'] safety" and that "there can certainly be no argument 
against [Hughes'] intent in this instance," the alleged statement 
cannot support a determination that Thometz was RIF'ed "on the 
basis of age alone." See Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6(4) (1989). The 
ALJ also erred by giving weight to Thometz' unsupported testimony 
that co-workers referred to him as "old man" and "grandpa." Order 
at 6 (R. at 753). Alleged age-related comments by non-
decisionmakers are insufficient, as a matter of law, to create an 
inference of age discrimination. Cone, 14 F.3d at 531-32. 
E. The Agency Erred in Its Reliance on Statistical 
Evidence Which Fails, As a Matter of Law, to 
Support an Inference That Age Actually Played a 
Role in the Decision to Include Thometz in a RIF. 
The statistical evidence concerning RIFs at Hercules also 
fails to support any inference that age actually played a role in 
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Hercules' decision to lay off Thometz. As stated by the Tenth 
Circuit in Fallis v. Kerr-McGee Corp.. 944 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 
1991): 
[I]n order for statistical evidence to create 
an inference of discrimination, the statistics 
must . . . eliminate nondiscriminatory 
explanations for the disparity. In other 
words, a plaintiff's statistical evidence must 
focus on eliminating nondiscriminatory 
explanations for the disparate treatment by 
showing disparate treatment between comparable 
individuals. 
Id, at 746. 
The statistics discussed in the ALJ's Order make no 
adjustment for departmental rankings of the employees included in 
the statistical pool; accordingly, the comparisons involve 
employees who were not similarly situated. See Cone, 14 F.3d at 
532 ("Disparate treatment cannot be shown by comparing the 
application of the policy to employees who are not similarly 
situated."). The statistical evidence also fails to eliminate 
nondiscriminatory explanations for alleged disparate treatment, 
i.e., that those laid off had lower performance evaluations and 
rankings than those retained, and it therefore does not permit an 
inference of pretext. The ALJ acknowledged that "these statistics 
do not show that Hercules' Bacchus Facility discriminated against 
[Thometz]," and on that basis alone, his statistical analysis 
should be disregarded. See Order at 5. 
Given the ALJ's misleading and inaccurate statistical 
analysis, Hercules is nevertheless compelled to set the record 
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s t r a i g h t . 8 The ALJ purports to ca lcu la te the "percentage of 
workers of a p a r t i c u l a r age group from the t o t a l workers for the 
same age group who were RIF'ed." Order a t 5 (R. a t 752). The ALJ 
concludes tha t the percentage of RIF'ed employees between 55-64 
years old i s "1.4 times the percentage of the next highest RIF'ed 
age group (25-29), and 3.5 times the percentage of the lowest 
RIF'ed age group (45-49)." Id . However, t h i s ca lcu la t ion i s 
inaccurate because the correct quotient i s f ive percent ( i . e . , 14 
RIF'ed out of 273 employees = 5%). Consequently, contrary to the 
Order, the percent of employees RIF'ed in the 55-64 age category i s 
ac tua l ly equivalent to the percent RIF'ed in the 25-29 age category 
and 2.5 times the percent RIF'ed in the 45-49 age category. 
Hercules contends tha t the s t a t i s t i c a l ana lys i s , 
submitted through the expert testimony of Bruce Hopkins, i s the 
more proper ana lys i s . This analys is demonstrates there i s no 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y s ign i f i can t difference between RIF'ed employees under 
40 years old and those 40 years of age and older . Of the 2,188 
8
 The ALJ's age groupings , e s p e c i a l l y the 60-64 age group, a re too small t o 
have s t a t i s t i c a l v a l i d i t y . The cou r t s have he ld t h a t small s t a t i s t i c a l sample 
groups a re i n h e r e n t l y u n r e l i a b l e and a re not p r o b a t i v e of i n t e n t i o n a l age 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . See, e . g . . F a l l i s , 944 F.2d a t 746 (group of 9 employees too 
small t o provide r e l i a b l e s t a t i s t i c a l r e s u l t s ; " [r]andom f l u c t u a t i o n s r ega rd ing 
the r e t e n t i o n or t e rmina t ion of j u s t one or two g e o l o g i s t s w i th in t h i s group 
dur ing the March 1986 r educ t ion in force would have had an enormous impact on the 
percen tage of g e o l o g i s t s over f o r t y who survived the r educ t i on in f o r c e . " ) ; Cone. 
14 F.3d a t 532; Sencrapta v . Morrison-Knudson Co., 804 F.2d 1072, 1076 (9th C i r . 
1986) ( s t a t i s t i c s from department of 28 employees was too small and should be 
d i s r ega rded , e s p e c i a l l y where l a r g e r group was a v a i l s i b l e ) ; Harper v . Transworld 
A i r l i n e s . 525 F.2d 409, 412 (5th C i r . 1975) ( " s t a t i s t i c a l evidence from an 
extremely small un ive r se has l i t t l e p roba t i ve va lue and must be d i sregarded ." ) ; 
Barnes v . Southwest Fores t I n d u s e s . . 654 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Fla . 1986) (noting 
t h a t two or t h r e e d e v i a t i o n s r u l e i s "suspect and u n r e l i a b l e " when sample s i z e 
i s s m a l l - - i n t h i s case 44 t e r m i n a t i o n s ) . 
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individuals employed by Hercules in the third quarter of 1992 (when 
Thometz was RIF'ed), 1,103 or approximately 50% were 40 years of 
age or over. Transcript at 318 (R. at 1140) . During that same 
quarter, 84 employees where RIF'ed, 39 of which or approximately 
46% were 40 years of age and older. Id. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the ALJ's grouping is 
appropriate, i.e., analyzing the population of employees between 
ages 50-69, the statistics in fact show there was no adverse impact 
to this age classification. If a comparison is made between the 
total plant population with the RIF population for these age 
groupings, the percentages come out equal. There were 535 
employees between the ages of 50-69, of which 23 (or 4 percent) 
were RIF'ed. Likewise, there were 1653 employees between the ages 
of 20-49 with 61 of those employees RIF'ed, or 4 percent. Another 
way to look at this data is that out of 2188 total employees, there 
were 535 employees between the ages of 50-69 (or 24%) and 1653 
employees between the ages of 20-49 (or 76%) . Of the total RIF 
population of 84 employees, 23 (or 27%) were between the ages of 
50-69 and 61 (or 73%) were between the ages of 20-49. 
In sum, the statistical data fails, as a matter of law, 
to support an inference that age actually played a role in the 
decision to include Thometz in the RIF. 
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III. THE AGENCY ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN DETERMINING THAT 
THOMETZ HAD NO DUTY TO MITIGATE HIS DAMAGES BY MAKING 
REASONABLE EFFORTS TO SEEK ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT. 
The agency erroneously ruled that Thometz had no duty to 
mitigate his damages by making reasonable efforts to seek, as well 
as to obtain, comparable employment. Thometz is not entitled to 
back pay for periods during which he voluntarily remained in 
idleness by not seeking or accepting reasonable comparable 
employment or by unjustifiably quitting a job. See, e.g., Taylor 
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975); Ford Motor 
Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982). 
The evidence is clear that Thometz failed to satisfy his 
obligation to seek comparable alternative employment so as to 
minimize or bring an end to the damages he has allegedly suffered. 
After his layoff, Thometz changed professions and worked as a 
salesman for Blaine Jensen RV Sales for approximately one year, 
from October 1992 until October 1993. Facts f 25. He then decided 
to quit that job because, according to his testimony, "they moved 
their office up to Kaysville, their store. And I didn't want to 
drive up to Kaysville in the middle of the winter because that's 
the slow months." Facts f 25. Although Thometz was entitled to 
change his career and work in a different business, he is not 
entitled to have Hercules pay him for his career choice. As the 
court concluded in Ford v. Nicks, 866 F.2d 865, 875 (6th Cir. 
1989), the plaintiff "was perfectly free to make [her new career] 
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choice, of course, but . • . she was not free to impose the cost of 
that decision on her former employer." 
Thometz did not even begin searching for employment 
comparable to his job at Hercules until July 1994, approximately 
eight months after quit his job at Blaine Jensen and nearly two 
years after he was laid off at Hercules. Facts 1 26. Thus, he 
cannot justify his idleness by any supposed lack of employment 
opportunities in his former area of work. Thometz is not entitled 
to receive a subsidized income from Hercules on the basis of his 
own decision to delay searching for comparable employment for 
nearly two years. By his own action, Thometz failed to mitigate his 
damages until July 1994, and the ALJ's Order should be modified 
accordingly. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Hercules respectfully requests 
that the ALJ's Order be overturned and judgment entered in favor of 
Hercules. 
DATED this 2>^day of March, 1996. 
KEITH E. /TAYLOR 
LOIS A. £AAR 
DOUGLAS R. DAVIS 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
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Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on October 
26, 1994 at 8:30 o,clock a.m. The hearing was 
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Benjamin A. Sims, Administrative Law Judge. 
The charging party, was present and was represented 
by Kenneth B. Grimes, Jr., Attorney at Law. 
The Respondent employer, Hercules Incorporated, was 
represented by Brent H. Shimada, Attorney at Law. 
This matter was continued from October 12, 1994, at the 
request of the charging party's (CP) counsel. At the conclusion of 
the evidentiary hearing held on October 26, 1994, each of the 
parties was given until November 15, 1994 to provide written 
closing statements. The statements were submitted on that date, 
and on November 16, 1994, the case was considered ready for an 
order by the administrative law judge. 
The applicable law in this case is the Antidiscrimination Act 
which is found at U.C.A. Section 34-35-1 et seq. (1969 as amended) . 
U.C.A. Section 34-35-6 (1989) provides in pertinent part: 
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice: 
(a)(i) for an employer to ... discharge, ... 
terminate any person, ... or discriminate in ... 
terms, priviletes, and conditions of employment 
against any person otherwise qualified, because of 
... age, if the individual is 40 years of age or ol-
der. ... 
* * * 
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(4) ... [E]xcept where age is a bona fide occupational 
qualification, no person shall be subject to involun-
tary termination ... from employment on the basis of 
age alone, if the individual is 40 years of age or ol-
der. 
In order to prevail in a claim of age discrimination, an 
employee must establish by a preponderance of evidence that his age 
was a determining factor in subjecting him to an adverse employment 
action. Except for Paragraph (4) noted above, an employee is not 
required to prove that his age was the sole motive for the 
employment action, only that the employment action would not have 
occurred, but for the employee's age. Texas Dept. of Community 
Affairs v. Burdine, 250 US 248, 256 (1981). 
Age discrimination may be established either by direct 
evidence of discriminatory motive, or other circumstantial evidence 
that the employer's stated motive is a pretext for discrimination, 
or through a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence. 
E.E.O.C. v. Flasher Co., Inc., 986 F.2d 1312, 1317 (10th Cir. 
1992). 
The respondent, Hercules, Inc. (Hercules), has undergone a 
number of reductions in force which were necessitated by the 
drastic economic downturn of the aerospace and defense industries. 
Since October 1990, the Hercules' Bacchus Works, the facility at 
issue in this case, has reduced its workforce by approximately 
1,800 employees. The CP was laid off in August 1992 as a result of 
one of those reductions in force. Faced with a significantly 
declining business base, Hercules had no choice, but to reduce the 
size of its work force. Rather than do this randomly, Hercules 
designed and implemented an extensive lay-off system which it 
claims maintained the skills it needed without discriminating 
against any protected class of employees. 
In the case of Rea v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1450 
(10th Cir. 1994)(Rea), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated 
that to prove a prima facia case of age discrimination in a 
reduction in force context, the charging party must show: 1. That 
he was in the protected age group; 2. that he was adversely 
affected by the employment decision; 3. that he was qualified for 
the position at issue; and, 4. that he was treated less favorably 
than younger employees during the reduction in force. Once the CP 
establishes a prima facie case, "the burden shifts [to the 
respondent] to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for 
the adverse employment decision." Rea, at 1454. 
The respondent's burden to show a legitimate nondiscrimination 
reason is not very great. The respondent can satisfy its burden 
merely by raising a genuine issue "of fact as to whether it 
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discriminated against the plaintiff. Rea, at 1454-1455. See 
Faulkner v. Super Value Stores, Inc. 3 F.3d 1419, 1425 (10th Cir. 
1993)(Faulkner). After the respondent provides nondiscriminatory 
reasons for its action, the CP must then present, "specific facts 
significantly probative to support an inference that [respondent's] 
proffered justifications were a pretext for discrimination." 
Faulkner, at 1425. In other words, "the [CP] must show that age 
actually played a role in the [respondent's] decision making 
process and was a determinative influence in the outcome." Id. 
Hercules concedes that the CP satisfied the first three 
elements of the prime facie case of age discrimination. These 
elements were that the CP: was in the protected age group, was 
qualified, and was adversely affected by the reduction in force 
(RIF). This opinion will not, therefore, discuss those issues in 
any detail. Hercules contends that the CP cannot satisfy the 
fourth element because the evidence does not show that he was 
treated less favorably than younger employees during the RIF's. 
The CP's education, work, and personal history will be 
reviewed. He attended Everett Junior College for 2 1/2 years 
studying engineering and mechanical machining. He also attended 
the Seattle Police Academy where he trained in criminal and arson 
investigations. He is a certified arson investigator. 
From September 1958 until August 1962, the CP worked for 
Boeing Aircraft Company as a: tool and pattern maker, plaster and 
plastic pattern maker, lead man in the pattern shop, inspector, 
and job coordinator. From August 1962 to February 1965, the CP 
worked for Western Gear Corporation as an assemblyman, a machinist 
apprentice, and in physical and chemical testing. From February 
1965 to May 1968, he worked for Everett Machine and Fabrication 
managing a machine shop and steel fabrication company. He prepared 
bids, set up procedures, operated lathes, mills, planers, surface 
grinders, did inspections, and set up metal fabrication gigs. 
From May 1968 to April 1979, the CP worked for the City of 
Everett Fire Department. He acted as a fire fighter and marshal as 
well as senior inspector and arson investigator. From April 1980 
to February 1982, he worked for Beehive Machinery as the manager of 
the quality assurance department, and as an inspector. From 
February 1982 to January 1984, he was semiretired. From January 
1984 to May 1984, he was the head of the quality control department 
and inspector for M & D, Inc. 
From May 1984 to August 1992, he worked for Hercules in 
quality assurance, quality control, inspecting end items, 
inspecting received items, and all types of hands on inspections, 
physical testing, document preparation, input and retrievable 
information, coordinating with manufacturing, engineering, customer 
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service, and training of new quality assurance engineers in 
document preparation for the material review board. 
He was one of those selected by his supervisor to be 
terminated in a reduction in force in August 1992. The list of all 
quality assurance nonexempt employees in Department 7600 in August 
1992 shows that the CP was the oldest, and that Jose L. Garcia, the 
next to be RIF'ed after the CP, was the next oldest. In terms of 
service with Hercules, Shirley D. Randazzo had the least amount, 
and the CP had the second least amount. Ms. Randazzo was one month 
junior to the CP in service. Jose L. Garcia was number three in 
terms of seniority. However, the CP, as well as% the other 
mentioned, were salaried employees, and Hercules did not have a 
seniority based system for salaried personnel. There was no 
evidence that the number of years with Hercules was a factor in 
determining retention. 
With regard to RIF's during the period of the CP's 
termination, the evidence shows that the following numbers were 
RIF'ed from the Hercules Baccus facility during 1991 - 1992. The 
following table was constructed from Hercules' data supplied to the 
IC, and reflects the number RIF'ed (top number) in comparison with 
the number who were aged 40 and over (bottom number) . It must be 
noted that the data supplied from Hercules was for the entire 
facility, and does not reflect the narrow subgroup of the composite 
structures group. Nevertheless, the Hercules' data will be 
studied: 
12/31/91 3/31/92 6/30/92 9/30/92 12/31/92 
RIF'd 157 113 35 84 105 
40 & Up 84 56 14 39 58 
The following table shows the number of workers RIF'ed who are 
50 and over (classified by the Social Security Administration as 
being of advanced age, and approaching advanced age) , and those who 
are 18 - 49 (younger workers). See 20 CFR Ch. Ill, Pt. 404, Subpt. 
P, App 2, 201.00(f), (g) , and (h) (1993). When the data is reviewed 
using the Social Security Administration classifications, the table 
looks somewhat different than the table above. 
12/31/91 3/31/92 6/30/92 9/30/92 12/31/92 
RIF'd 157 113 35 84 105 
20-49 109 86 31 61 71 
50-69 48 17 4 23 34 
It would seem more appropriate to use this breakdown since the 
applicant was in the 55-59 age groupr,- and presumably discrimination 
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would be more likely to occur the older a worker becomes* This 
analysis would place the worker into a group aged 50 - 69 which is 
more related to his age than to the group aged 40 - 69. The 
numbers and percentages of individuals of the ages shown in the 
following table were RIF'd during the September 30, 1992 reduction. 
The percentages shown are the percentage of workers for a 
particular age group from the total workers for the same age group 
who were RIF'ed. 
20 - 24 
25 - 29 
30 - 34 
35 - 39 
40 - 44 
45 - 49 
50 - 54 
55 - 59 





















It should be noted that the percentages were rounded up or 
down, as appropriate, and the total may therefore add to a 
different percentage than the actual overall percentage. Hercules 
stated that it found that there was no statistical evidence that 
there was any age group which was unfairly represented in its RIF. 
It might* be argued that the 60 - 64 year old age is represented at 
about twice to almost three times the percentages of the other 
groups. Three individuals were RIF'ed out of 32. 
When the 55-59 age group is added to the 6 0 - 6 4 age group, 
the percentages show that the RIF'ed number of 55' - 64 year olds 
consisted of approximately seven per cent which is more than 1.4 
times the percentage of the next highest RIF'ed age group (25 -
29), and 3.5 times the percentage of the lowest RIF'ed age group 
(45 - 49). Although the caution flag is raised, these statistics 
do not show that the Hercules Bacchus Facility discriminated 
against the CP. However, they do show that a significantly higher 
percentage of workers were RIF'ed in the 55 - 64 year old age group 
than were RIF'ed in the younger age groups. Nevertheless, because 
of the status of the basic data, the evidence mustered by the CP 
will be reviewed to determine whether the specific proof is 
sufficient to make out a case of age discrimination, and in the 
course of the review, the data set forth by Hercules to explain its 
actions will be viewed more carefully because of the statistics. 
The personnel displacement list shows how the supervisor 
ranked her employees for RIF. The list shows that the two oldest 
employees were to be RIF'ed. The CP was the first to be RIF'ed. 
He was 55 years old at the time that he was placed on this list. 
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The next employee to be RIF'ed was Garcia who was age 44 at the 
time of his placement. 
Out of the remaining four employees, their ages ranged from 40 
- 31 years. The order of removal of these employees after the CP 
and Garcia would be: Robert Fellows - age 31; Dalton Driggers -
age 33; Shirley Randazzo - age 40; and Steven Done - age 34. The 
average age of the remaining employees would have been reduced to 
34.5 years if the CP and Garcia were removed. If only the CP were 
removed, the average age would have been diminished to 3 6.4 years. 
The CP argues that his claim of age discrimination is 
supported by both direct and circumstantial evidence of 
discriminatory motive on the part of Hercules. He urges that 
within a few months prior to his selection for RIF, his supervisor, 
Lisa Hughes made a statement on two occassions that he should "let 
the younger guys" do his work. The evidence shows that this remark 
was made after the CP had returned to work subsequent to being off 
work for cancer treatment, and during a discussion with Ms. Hughes 
in which the CP had complained of the burden of lifting various 
heavy items during the inspection process. 
Ms. Hughes testified that she made this statement out of 
concern for the CP, and out of concern for his safety. There can 
certainly be no argument against her intent in this instance. 
However, it is at least apparent that the statement impliedly 
reflects Ms. Hughes belief that the "younger guys" should do the 
work because they were capable of doing the lifting and other 
requirements. Assuming rationality and intent behind all 
expressions uttered unless the context shows otherwise, if Ms. 
Hughes did not mean to say "younger," she would not have done so. 
At hearings and trials, words stated often are dissected for 
meaning that may have been motivated by the unconscious or 
conscious brain at the time of verbalization. The statement "let 
the younger guys" do the work, while benevolent, is anathema in the 
discrimination context, and while not dispositive of this case is 
some evidence as to how the CP was viewed by Ms. Hughes at least on 
the day and time of utterance. 
The CP also testified that several of the CP's coworkers 
referred to him as "old man" and "grandpa." He further testified 
that such statements were made in the presence of Ms. Hughes, and 
that she took no action with respect to these statements. Ms. 
Hughes testified that she does not recall these statements being 
made. The evidence of his coworker's statements will be given 
little weight in the overall analysis. 
The CP's supervisor placed the applicant on the RIF list 
without reviewing the performance "records or talking to the 
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individuals concerned. There was no Hercules' policy that the 
performance records be reviewed or that the individuals be 
consulted. However, this action indicates a great reliance on the 
information which she carried with her including her understanding 
of the CP's capabilities and of his value to Hercules. It was 
apparent that she on several previous oceassions had felt that 
younger people should do portions of the CP's job. 
The CP next argues that there is additional direct evidence of 
age discrimination shown by the notes made by the Policy Compliance 
Committee (PCC) . The PCC was designed by Hercules to review the 
individuals selected for RIF to insure nondiscriminatory compliance 
with the Hercules' RIF plan. As evidenced by the PCC policy 
(Respondent's Exh. 5) , and the testimony of Mr. John D. Bailey, 
director of human resources for Composite Structures, the process 
entailed first ranking all employees by performance, and next 
selecting the lowest ranked employees for layoff. Then, the 
rankings and layoff recommendations were presented to an internal 
review committee. The policy committee was to review the 
recommendations to be sure that they were supported by job 
performance, and were not impacted in any manner by discriminatory 
motives. 
The evidence shows that the PCC committee was to assure that 
the "specific practices and procedures used to identify and select 
persons for separation are in compliance with [Hercules'] policies 
and all applicable laws and regulations (including, but not limited 
to; EEO, ADEA, ERISA, COBRA, etc.).11 Respondent's Exh. at 443. In 
addition, the following four objectives were to be considered by 
the CP's supervisor to select those employees to be RIF'ed: 
a. Maintain the best workforce, upgrading where 
possible; 
b. Avoid any discriminatory actions in regard to race, 
sex, age, pension discrimination, etc.; 
c. Minimize geographic relocations between facilities, 
offices and plants; and, 
d. Restrict training and/or retraining to 
familiarization/orientation of displaces personnel proposed for 
reassignment to a different position. 
Id-
No action could be taken to displace or to separate the CP 
without the prior approval of the PCC. The PCC met to review the 
proposed action of the CP's supervisor, and discussed the 
supervisor's list of potential RIF-*s with her. There was little 
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testimony as to what the PCC actually discussed since the witnesses 
could not remember much about the consideration of applicant by the 
PCC or the presentation made by the applicant's supervisor before 
the PCC. The testimony by Hercules' witnesses noted the goal of 
the PCC to prevent discrimination against parties in protected 
classes, and they testified that they weire sure that the PCC did in 
fact do that. 
The notes of the PCC reflect that one member of the PCC noted 
that Mr. Garcia was hispanic (respondent's exh. at 313); another 
reports that Randazzo, Driggers, Garcia, and Thometz were 
••similar," but that Driggers was an outstanding performer 
(respondent's exh. at 314); another reported that Garcia was 
hispanic, but also circled the ages. of Randaz'zo, Garcia, and 
Thometz who were the oldest three employees on this list. The 
explanation given by Hercules as to why some of the PCC wrote 
information about protected categories was that this was the reason 
for the existence of the PCC; that is,, the PCC was to ensure that 
illegal considerations had not resulted in the placement of 
employees on the RIF lists. However, no member of the PCC 
testified as to what he or she meant by the notations. The CP 
argues that these notations are per se discriminatory because they 
show that age and other illegal characteristics were considered by 
the PCC. 
Hercules argues that the PCC had to consider what would 
normally be impermissible factors such as age, race, gender in 
order to protect the employee's civil rights. There was no 
evidence to show that the PCC had a beneficial effect on protecting 
any employee's rights. This is not to say that it did not protect 
such rights, only that such protection would have to be implied 
because there was no evidence that the PCC ever found that any 
employee was placed on the list in violation of guidelines. 
Perhaps all of the supervisors were well trained, and did not 
ever consider impermissible characteristics in violation of 
discrimination law. On the other hand, when some of the individual 
members noted the protected categories of the various individuals 
on the RIF lists, there was at least an inference that the 
characteristics were being improperly considered especially when 
there was testimony that nine out of 15 employees of the composite 
structures selected for RIF at the time that the CP was selected 
were over 50. At the best, there was no direct evidence that the 
notes were made to protect the workers. 
There is really no reason to consider the age, race, gender, 
national origin or other impermissible factors when a person is 
determined to be eligible for a RIF based upon performance 
characteristics. Writing down such characteristics tends to 
bolster the view that improper factors were being considered. 
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Value to Hercules was the professed criterium which Hercules claims 
was the most important attribute. That should have been the factor 
which was preeminent in the minds of the PCC and the supervisor. 
There is at least some evidence that other illegal factors were 
considered, and although Hercules may argue that the PCC did the 
antidiscrimination job for which it was created, there was little 
evidence that the PCC acted as the Hercules' Reduction in Force 
Policy stated that it would. Respondent's Exh. At 442. 
The supervisor says that she placed the CP on the bottom of 
the list because he was the least valuable to Hercules. Although 
Hercules claimed that age was not a permissible factor for a 
supervisor to consider except to use to retain the oldest employee 
where a tie existed in a value comparison, there is often little 
direct evidence that age is a factor in placing someone on the RIF 
list in age discrimination cases. 
Ms. Lisa Hughes, the supervisor, started work for Hercules in 
May 1985 as a reliability engineer in the Aerospace Propulsion 
Division. She was a quality engineer from 1986 until March 1988. 
From 1988 to 1992, she described herself as a "pseudo manager.11 
She is currently the quality safety manager for the Specialty 
Structures Division. 
In November 1991, the CP was transferred to her department in 
the MCS program because of the needs of Hercules. She states that 
she believed that the CP could do floor inspections, and did not 
consider whether he could do other tasks. She claims that she 
interacted with the CP daily. 
Sometime after April 1992, she was told to rank her employees 
for a possible RIF. She did so. Respondent's Exh. 3. She 
realised in June 1992 that there would be a RIF. She discussed the 
RIF with her subordinate Mr. Nuttal. There was much discussion in 
the testimony about the relative merits and performan.ee ratings of 
the CP and compared to Mr. Garcia. There was evidence presented 
that the CP was generally regarded as being a more valuable 
employee than Mr. Garcia because of his more varied experience, and 
because of his working in the "closed" section (working on security 
classified materials) more than Mr. Garcia. It is noted, however, 
that both he and Mr. Garcia were placed at the bottom, and next to 
the bottom of the list, respectively. 
Mr. Nuttal related that in his view, the CP should-have been 
placed on the bottom of the list because Mr. Garcia "was a 
communicator and could pull people together." However, there was 
testimony given by others that the CP was able to deal with others, 
and was a facilitator. Apparently,. Ms. Hughes conveyed her list to 
Mr. Nuttal, and he agreed that the CP was properly on the bottom of 
the list. Mr. Nuttal had spent only several months with the CP. 
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Mr. Nuttal had no independent authority to construct the list, and 
the list was the product of Ms. Hughes' thought processes, and her 
understanding of the CP's strengths and weaknesses. 
Although there was little difference between the performance 
ratings of Garcia and the CP, and which' are proximate to the the 
RIF date, the CP had more varied experience while working in the 
field. He had spent a good deal of time in the "closed" area which 
consisted of a variety of work in security intensive areas. Mr. 
Garcia had spent most of his time in the "Boeing Springs" area, 
although the CP had also performed some work in this function. The 
evidence tends to show that based upon the CP's work history he was 
capable of performing more varied types of duties than was Mr. 
Garcia. The supervisor says that she was not aware of the CP's 
performance in other divisions, and admits that she did not seek to 
find out the nature of his performance. She was primarily aware of 
his performance in her operation, and she felt that his value to 
Hercules was the least of anyone who worked for her. 
Ms. Hughes had only a few months more than Mr. Nuttal to work 
with the CP. The evidence shows generally that with the exception 
of the supervisor, and Mr. Nuttal, at least three individuals 
testified that the CP was a superior employee to Mr. Garcia. Mr. 
Bradford testified that the CP had a breadth of experience and 
ability. Mr. Walker testified that the CP had performed all of the 
various quality inspection functions on various projects during the 
time that the CP worked in Composite Structures. Although the 
supervisor • denies knowing that the CP worked in all of these 
capacities, it is difficult to understand how she could be unaware 
of this. The conclusion is inescapable that the supervisor felt, 
either consciously or unconsciously, that the CP's age, and perhaps 
other factors such as his health, were significant considerations 
which when weighed with his job performance dictated that he be 
relegated to the bottom of the list. 
The CP did not raise the health issue as one of disability, 
and this issue has not been considered in reaching a decision on 
this case. 
DAMAGES: 
Where a case of age discrimination is proved under Utah law, 
the Commission is authorized to: 
[I]ssue an order requiring the respondent to cease 
any discriminatory or prohibited employment practice 
and to provide relief to the complaining party, in-
cluding reinstatement, back pay and benefits, and 
attorneys' fees and costs. 
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U.C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(9) (1991). 
With regard to back pay and benefits, the CP showed that at 
the time of his layoff on August 31, 1992 he was earning $2,411 per 
month. He was given severance pay of $9,644 to December 31, 1992, 
and he is considered to have been compensated for the period from 
August 31, 1992 through December 31, 1992. 
He showed that his lost wages from January 1, 1993 to October 
26, 1994 would have been $53,042. He did not include any raises 
during this period which might have been given by the employer. 
The evidence shows that he earned income of $19,734.34 from 
Blaine Jensen R.V. Sales subsequent to. his termination. This 
amount must be deducted from the lost wages which he claims. The 
resulting amount of lost wages minus the earned income from Blaine 
Jensen is $33,307.66. 
The CP claims ten percent interest which the Utah 
Antidiscrimination Division awarded him. There is no provision of 
the Antidiscrimination Act which allows a ten percent interest 
award, and the CP has not indicated any law upon which the 
Commission can rely to impose this interest award. Under the 
circumstances, the interest cannot be imposed. 
With regard to the claimed loss of $1,871.93 from the CP/s 
investment and savings plan, the evidence is insufficient to show 
the terms of the plan, and the Commission is unable to calculate 
damages based upon the presentation. The stated loss of stock 
value of 151 1/2 shares of Hercules' stock coupled with the claim 
by- the CP that he lost "approximately two shares per month" (44 
shares) at $101.25 as of October 1994 is likewise speculative, and 
the testimony did not show any detail of the CP's participation in 
the plan, nor did it show in a reasonable manner how the damages 
were calculated. 
The Commission is unaware of the terms of the stock plan, and 
in addition, it would seem reasonable to calculate damages based 
upon the difference between the purchase price minus the sale price 
or fair market value at the time of hearing. The testimony was not 
clear, and the evidence did not show how the damages were 
calculated. The damages claimed for stock loss amounted to $4,455 
for 44 shares at $101.25 per share. The claim of $4,455 is the 
entire value of 44 shares at $101.25, and in order to claim this 
amount, it would be necessary for the two shares to be given to the 
employee without cost each month. This is inconsistent with the 
claim that the shares were purchased at a reduced cost. In 
addition, there is no showing that the wages from which the shares 
would have been purchased were reduced by the amount of the 
purchase. Failure to do this would^iiave created a duplication in 
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the amount of loss claimed for wages, and in the purchase of the 
shares. Under the circumstances, the Commission is unable to 
ferret out the facts as to the amount of the stock loss. 
After carefully considering the amount of damages, it is found 
that the amount of damages which have been proved is $33,307.66. 
ATTORNEYS' FEES: 
Kenneth B. Grimes, Jr. is the attorney of record for the CP in 
this case. Attorneys' fees are authorized to a prevailing party 
under U.C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(9) (1991). He has billed his 
services at $100 per hour. This rate is within the prevailing rate 
for attorneys in the Salt Lake City area. Mr. Grimes has provided 
a detailed listing of the services rendered, and the hours worked. 
He shows that he worked on this case for 93.45 hours. He claims 
total fees of $9,345. This amount is reasonable for the services 
provided, and will be approved. 
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. The charging party, Loel D. Thometz, was in the protected 
age group at the time of his termination from Hercules. 
2. He was adversely affected by a termination from 
employment. 
3. He was qualified for his position. 
4. He was treated less favorably than younger employees. 
5. Numbers 1, 2, and 3 were conceded by the employer. 
6. Number 4 was proved by a preponderance of the evidence 
discussed above. 
7. The amount of damages proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence was $33,307.66. 
8. There was insufficient evidence to show the loss of value 
of the Hercules' stock, or to show that Hercules or its agent 
caused the charging party to lose money on the stock. 
9. There is no statutory authority allowing the Commission to 
award any interest on damages under the Utah Antidiscrimination 
Act. 
10. The charging party was terminated in violation of U.C.A. 
Section 34-35-6 (1989). 




IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Hercules reinstate the charging 
party to a position with salary and benefits commensurate to that 
which the charging party would have had if he had not been 
terminated from employment. U.C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(9) (1991). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Hercules pay the charging party 
back pay of $33,307.66, and pay his attorney's fees and costs of 
$9,345. U.C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(9) (1991). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Hercules cease any discriminatory 
or prohibited employment practice against those who are 40 years 
old and older in violation of U.C.A. Section 34-35-6 (1989). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is 
timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days from the 
date of filing with the Commission, in which to file a written 
response with the Commission in accordance with Section 63-46b-
12(2), Utah Code Annotated. 
Dated this / J day of /• ^>-*-^~
 y 1995. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
B;e*nj^ 1iiin A. Sims 
Xdirflnistrative Law Judge 
ORD\THOMETZ 
MAILING of Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
I certify that I have mailed the attached document in the 
case of LOEL D THOMETZ, Case No. 8930254, to the following parties by 
first class prepaid postage on the f^> day of Mar 95. 
BRENT SHIMADA,- Atty, 
HERCULES INCORPORATED BACCHUS WORKS 
MAGNA UT 84044 
KENNETH B GRIMES, JR, Atty, 
343 S 4TH E 
SLC UT 84111 
' Nicole mcClain 
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Case No. 6-93-0254 
Hercules, Inc. asks! 
review the Administrative 
violated the Utah Anti-D 
Title 34, Chapter 35, 
Thometz* employment on ac] 
The Industrial Commission of Utah to 
Law Judge's determination that Hercules 
Lscriminatory Act ("the Act" hereafter; 
Utah Code Ann.) by terminating Loel D. 
pount of his age. 
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over this 
Motion for Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-l2, Utah Code 
Ann. §34-35-7.1(11), and Utah Admin. Code R560-1-4.5, 
ISfeUSS TOPER REVIEW 
Hercules1 motion fori review raises 12 objections and errors 
which can be categorized J as follows; 1) Did the ALJ err in his 
evaluation of the statistical evidence regarding Hercules' 
employment practices; 2) kre the ALJ's findings of fact supported 
by the record; and 3) Has Mr. Thometz failed to mitigate his 
damages• 
BACKQRQUND 
irrdloy Mr. Thometz was e 
August 1992, when he was 
the time of his discharge, 
work group, at 55 years o|f 
ed by Hercules from May 1984 until 
discharged in a reduction in force. At 
Mr, Thometz was the oldest member of his 
age. 
Mr. Thometz filed a charge of age discrimination against 
Hercules with the Utah Antidiscrimination Division ("UADD"). UADD 
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investigated the matter anil found reasonable cause to believe that 
Hercules had unlawfully discriminated against Mr. Thornetz on the 
basis of his age. 
Hercules then requested and received a de novo evidentiary 
hearing on Mr. Thornetz1 charge• Based on the evidence and argument 
presented during the evidefctiary hearing, the ALJ concluded, as had 
UADD, that Hercules had! unlawfully discriminated against Mr. 
Thornetz on account of his kge. Hercules then filed its motion for 
review with the Industrial Commission. 
DISCUSSION 
Mr. Thornetz1 charge of discrimination against Hercules is 
based on §34-35-6 of thfe Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act, which 
provides in material part jas follows: 
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice: 
(a) (1) for an employer to . • • terminate any person 
. . . because of . 1 .. age, if the indiividual is 40 
years of age or oldest • • • -
The Industrial 
challenge the ALJ's 
the Act, nor does Herculefc 
burdens of proof and 
Hercules1 argument is 
have accepted Hercules• 
Contrtfission notes that Hercules does not 
of the foregoing provision of 
challenge the ALJ's allocation of the 
to the parties. Essentially, 
to the contention that the ALJ should 






In reviewing the decision of .THE ALJ, the Industrial Commission 
not bound by the ALJ's findings and may make its own 
determinations of fact. ! (See §63-46b-12, Utah Administrative 
Practices Act.) However, phe Industrial Commission recognizes the 
ALJ has had the benefit ot observing first hand the testimony of 
witnesses. Furthermore, tile ALJ's understanding of the context of 
evidence may be superior* to that of the Industrial Commission. 
Consequently, the Industrial Comirdssion will not lightly substitute 
its judgment on questions of disputed testimony for the judgment of 
the ALJ. 
In this case, Hercules1 first argument is that the^  ALJ 
misunderstood or misstated(the significance of statistical 'evidence 
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regarding Hercules* employmfent practices.- However, a careful reading 
of the ALJ's decision reveals that he did not place any particular 
importance on such statistical evidence. 
Next, in a series of io additional points, Hercules argues the 
ALJ erred in accepting the testimony of Mr. Thometz and his witnesses 
on various points of disputled fact. However, Hercules demonstrates 
iittle, if any, support ii the record for its positions. Having 
reviewed these matters, thd Industrial Commission accepts the ALJ's 
findings of fact and concludes/ as . did the ALJ, that Hercules 
unlawfully discriminated against Mr. Thometz on the basis of his age. 
Finally, Hercules argujes Mr. Thometz has failed to mitigate the 
damages he suffered from Hercules' unlawful discrimination. However, 
Hercules provides no legal! or factual analysis in support of this 
argument. The Industrial Commission, notes that Mr- Thometz has 
substantially mitigated his damages by obtaining other employment. 
Furthermore, under the decisions issued in this matter by UADD, the 
ALJ, and now the Industrial Commission, Hercules was ordered to 
reinstate Mr* Thometz in his previous position. Arguably, Mr. 
Thometz was under no oblig4tion to seek or accept work elsewhere. 
In summary, the Industrial Commission finds the points raised in 
Hercules1 motion for review to be without merit. The Industrial 
Commission therefore adopts! the findings and conclusions set forth in 
the decision of the ALJ. 
flEfiEB 
The Industrial Commission hereby affirms the decision of the ALJ 
and denies Hercules1 motion for review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this day of Jseptember, 1995. 
:oIleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
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CPjfCTRRING OEIKIQH 
I concur in the order of the majority; However, I disagree with 
the ALJ's finding that Hercules' Policy Compliance Committee (PCC) 
should have, in effect, leit a blank record of its activities. It 
seems to this writer that tne PCC did exactly what it was supposed to 
do in providing a roadblocJc to any potential discriminatory ace on 
the part of those involved in the initial reduction-in- force 
selection process. 
To view the PCC's activity as somehow impermissible turns a 
beneficial process upside Gown and dangerously makes wrong out of 
right. Because the PCC failed to do .what it was intended to do in 
this case, it is now cast hjy the ALJ in a slightly villainous role. 
Therefore, the reason If or ray concurrence arises distinctly out 
of supervisor Hughes own j testimony, plus the testimony of the 
charging party, and not the (more elaborate scenarioxfound by the ALJ. 
'SKA* fKi^dlOr^ 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
NPTICJE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the) Commission to reconsider this Order by 
filing a Request for Reconsideration with the Conmiission within 2C 
days of the date of this Orfier. Alternatively, any party may appeal 
this Order to the Utah Court, of Appeals by filing a Petition For 
Review with that Court witHin 30 days of the date of this Order* 
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f ! E R * I g I g A T E OP MATT.TMQ 
I certify that a copy;of the foregoing Qrder Denying Motion For 
Review in the matter of ioEL D. THOMETZ> Case No. 93-0254, was 
mailed first class postage (prepaid this /*} day of September, 1995, 
to the following: 
RICHARD W. PERKINS 
KENNETH B. GRIMES, JR. 
343 SOUTH 4TH EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8411iL 
BRENT H. SHIMADA 
5006 SOUTH 8400 WEST 
MAGNA, UTAH 84044 
LOEL D THOMETZ 
10506 NORTH 40 WAY 
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y HERCULES Interoffice Memo 
Aerospace Company cc: R. Schwartz - 8414 NE 
T. V. McCarthy - 2123 NW 
R. R. Currie, Jr. - 2175 NW 
B. E. Zepke - 8333 SE 
D. R. Tabinowski - 11137 NW 
Wilmington, Delaware 
April 20, 1990 
COMPANY PROPRIETARY 
TO: Mr. J. F. Hixon/Mr. H. A. Spatz - ABL 
Ms. R. L. Novak/Mr. R. A. Weber - Bacchus 
Mr. 0. G. Martin/Mr. J. 0. Mack III - Clearfield 
Mr. J. Paolillo/Mr. R. J. Savoy - Clearwater O 
Mr. W. J. Marks/Mr. T. E. Babbony - Hatfield ° 
Mr. W. Martin/Mr. R. P. Hedeman - Kenvil ^ 
Mr. E. C. Graesser/Mr. J. T. Ferguson - McGregor "L. 
Mr. E. K. Hurley/Mr. C. R. Lee - Radford j ^ 
Mr. R. H. Heller/Mr. A. L. Meadows - Sunflower 
Mr. D. R. Forsythe/Mr. R. L. Frank - Simmonds/Norwich-Chester 
Mr. A. R. VanKoevering/Mr. W. E. Kenerson - Simmonds/Vergennes 
Mr. A. J. Samuelsen/Mr. S. J. Ness - Simmonds/Cedar Knolls 
Mr. D. E. Bossle/Mr. G. H. Van Arsdale - Simmonds/Ft. Lauderdale 
FROM: L. J. DiGiovanni - 11343 SE 
REDUCTION IN FORCE POLICY 
Hercules Incorporated has recently adopted a Reduction-In-Force 
Policy which covers all salaried employees at.all Hercules locations. In 
addition, the corporation has created a Policy Compliance Committee (PCC) 
which has the responsibility of assuring that the specific practices and 
procedures used to identify and select persons for separation are in 
compliance with corporate policy and all applicable laws and regulations 
including, but not limited to, EEO, ADEA, ERISA, COBRA, etc. 
Effective immediately, all reductions-in-force must be approved by 
the PCC prior to the implementation of the RIF. 
Attached is a copy of the Reduction-In-Force Policy. Also attached 
is a blank and completed sample of the Personnel Displacement List form 
which is to be used and the information which is to be gathered on employees 
who will be part of any reduction-in-force. Please note that when utilizing 
the form exempts should be separated from nonexempts, and rankings should be 
completed by job, function, or department - whichever makes the most sense* 
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact 




- ' C Y CCMPLIANCS C O M M I T S ; 
:UCT1QN-1N-F0RCH POLICY 
M I S S I O N 
l i t t e e (PCC) !r! 
ng t h a t t h e 
The HERCULES INCORPORATED P o l i c y Compl iance Coram 
. i s e s t a b l i s h e d fo r the e x p r e s s p u r p o s e of a s s u r i * ^ *^*«w v . ^ 
s p e c i f i c p r a c t i c e s and p r o c e d u r e s u sed to i d e n t i f y end s e i e c ^ 
p e r s o n s for s e p a r a t i o n a r e in c o m p l i a n c e w i t h C o r p o r a t e Im-
p o l i c i e s and a l l a p p l i c a b l e laws and r e g u l a t i o n s ( i n c l iiri \ n,c / ,^  
h u t n o t l i m i t e d t o : EEO, ADEA, ERISA, COBRA, e t c . ) * 
GBJbC \ i Vfcu . '. 
The f o l l o w i n g toui, o b j e c t i v e s s h a l l be c o n s i d e r e d as t h e b a s i c 
p r i n c i p l e s t o be fo l lowed in any end e l l r e d u c t i o n s - i n- fnrce 
i n i t i a t e d by HERCULES. 
r," •
 l
 <s b e s t w o r k f o r c e , u p g r a d i n g wnere ^ ', \i'r1^ 
i? . A.void any* a i s c r m u u u t o r y i c r i o n s in r e g a r d to r a c e , s e x , 
ace, pen r-'ion d i s c r i m i n a t i o n * • ! 
Minimize geographic LV Luxa t ions be tween f a c i l i t i e s , 
o f f i c e s .~nri p l a n t s 4 and, 
R e s t r i c t t r a i n i n g a n a / u i r e - t r a i n i n g t o f a m i l i a r i z a t i o n / 
o r i e n t a t i o n of d i s p l a c e d p e r s o n n e l p r o p o s e d for 
r e a s s i g n m e n t to a d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n . 
COVERAGE: 
1'he PCC shall have jurisdiction .•••-. . .cuctions-i:;~ force ,-:: 
U.S. locations : i: HERCULES that involve salaried employees 
AU[HOF 
)1~ c c : i w ; . , : , : e g a r c i , . g i n d i v i d u a l s i d e n t i f i e d IUC 
^ . _ p iacsHien : and /o r s e p a r a t i o n s h a l l be i n i t i a t e d w i t h o u t 
p r i o r approva 1 c f ~h*" c r ' * * 
<*,
 t-cu - . . . review t h e a c t i o n s p u j g o s e d by each B u s i n e s s 
Group or C o r p o r a t e Depar tment w i t h t h e s e n i o r e x e c u t i v e 
c*r •.-,..> - r g a n i z a t i o n * 
wv:en FCC d e t e r m i n e s u,.-x. r~ccrrj::ended a c t i o n s a r e i n 
c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e a p p l i c a b l e p o l i c i e s a n d ^ l e g a l 
r e q u i r e m e n t s , v-* * - - ' c h o r i z e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n ^of such 
a p p r o v e d a c t i c : : - - - i - - . w i t h e s t a b l i s h e d 
j . : - . . t 
2 # XI:- £•:•: . _' report to, and bfc __-:. c;;.. direction ot, -
Chair'^r - le Personnel Policy Committee. 
NOTE; PCC snail not have .. ^r i ,: j approve 
o, -aiinf; " structures, although they may ofttir 
?t;^~r In keeping w»t:t"1 
T H r POLICY COMPLIANCE CO^.ITTEE 
RESucnoNziNzloBci-eoklci -
PCC__MEMB£HSHiP 
Ehe PCC i s compr i sed o£ t h e D i r e c t o r , C o r p o r a t e Employes 
R e l a t i o n s , B u s i n e s s U n i t o r C o r p o r a t e F u n c t i o n a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , and C o r p o r a t e L e g a l C o u n s e l ; 
The Chairman, I e r so i u t e l P o l i c y Co mm i t t e e w i l l appo in t b o t h 
a C h a i r p e r s o n e n d , ' V i c e - C h a i r p e r s o n of t h e PCC, The 
V i c e - C h a i r p e r s o n wi l l , s e r v e as Chai r \ ?h e n t h e C h a i r p e r s o n 
i s a b s e n t ; 
A m a j o r i t y of t h e PCC members must be p r e s e n t a t any 
m e e t i n g to o f f i c i a l l y c o n d u c t and t r a n s a c t any b u s i n e s s ; 
j \ i; E ia jor l ty of t h o s e p r e s e n t must a p p r o v e - o r d i s a p p r o v e 
any p r o p o s a l s a n d / o r a c t i o n s recommended by a s p e c i f i c 
Group on .Depar tmen t 
APPEALS 
An appeal process is provided in the event a Group or 
Department desires t o o poos e a r i 11 ] n q o £ t h e PCC: 
[ he Appeal Board will he comprised of the 
Vice President, Human 'Resources, and the Chairman, 




1 " ' 
HEHCULES INCORPORATED 
TrE POLICY COMPLIANCE COMMUTE; 
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
1" o a s s u r e r e t e n t i o n of the b e s t w o r k f o r c e , the c r i t e r i a 
f o r s e 1 ec t i on of t h o s e i nd i v i dt 1a i s to. u * d \ so 1 aced w i l l 
b e i n t h i s o r d e r o f p r i o r i t y : 
c J o b p e r f o r m a n c e ; 
b P r i o r e x p e r i e n c e , i n c l u d i n g t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
. v e r s a t i l i t y and f l e x i b i l i t y i n ter ras of known and 
d e m o n s t r a t e d pe r fo rmance on o t h e r f u n c t i o n a l 
r e s g o n s i b i 1 i t i e s ; 
c . E d u c a t i o n app l i cd r j . i i b ; 
d . R e l s t I ve n b i 1 i ty ; 
&. P h y s i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s to p e r f o r m i n g a f u n c t i o n o t h e r 
t h a n t h a t on which c u r r e n t l y a s s i g n e d ( s u p p o r t e d by 
med i c a 1 documen t a z i o n,) ; 
i:: Axl j " is t e d s e r v i ce d a t e / t h e n c o n t i n u o u s s e r v i c e ; 
i f a l l of 11 ie above a r e equa l -
g Date of B i r t h ( r e t e n t i o n p r e f e r e n c e sI i a 1 3 be g r a n t e d 
t o the s e n i o r aged employee) . 
The p r o c e s s s t a r t s . w ^ w _ _._ ^ : ; \ v . : ^wsu r 
d e s i g n i n g t h e new o r g a n i z a t i o n ^r.ich w i l l i n d i c a t e tr:e 
c h a n g e s and r e d u c t i o n s on t h e new o r g a n i z a t i o n c h a r t . 
F o l l o w i n g a p p r o v a l of t h e new o r g a n i z a t i o n s t r u c t u r e , 
t h e Uni t E x e c u t i v e w i l l s c h e d u l e a m e e t i n g with t h e 
P o l i c y Compl iance Commit tee (?CC) t o s e e k approva l of 
t h e s e p a r a t i o n and d i s p l a c e m e n t r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s . 
At t h i s m e e t i n g , t h e U n i t E x e c u t i v e - ' ' £2fe FCC 
with: ~ ° 
CD 
r n 
THE POLICY COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE 
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS F £ a 8 2 
a• Copies of the current organization cI ia c t Ident i fy i nc 
those positions to be e l i m i n a t e d , t r a n s f e r r e d or ' 
combined. These charts will also I d e n t i f y the 
current incumbents tor each po s i t i o n . 
b . Copies of the new, approved o r g a n i z a t i o n chart 
identifying the recommended candidates for each 
D O si t I.Q n 
A listing i certifying each person s eIe c n e"1 toc 
separation from the existing organization* The 
listing shall include the following information for 
each individual identified; 
1 Name ar id 
, i V- J, i. X ~ <- • f 
1




 t •-V" "
 Ar
^ Adjusted S e r v i c e Date 
• .i^ :« c f Sir^h snci Aue *.,. L'J'JH) 
1
 • f'IT-nance evaluation ranking or code */" 
education 
Recommended action 
, i, L 1.1. LU the above, the work history and 
J.M ,manes appraisal records for each employee are 
to be available for review h'.* f-h^  ^CC-
The Unit Executive vil 1 present to the FCC, the baa is on 
which the retention or separation recommendations have 
been made far each * ••'•vidual so identified: 
a. The rationale for 'keeping .i M I L nut ""'B**' must^be 
discussed - including why WB" cannot be demoted 
ana/or transferred to another position; 
h . • Aae i s n o t C « f l V . . se l ec t i on c rocess . 
However, in the event that a i l other c r i t e r i a are 
equaiL^«c4.ud: ng the same continuous ses^ica date) , ^  
th^morfe sehior aged empi re s would be re ta ined; and, 
never a f a c t e in, thebu • • i 5 p 1 acemeiit^ 
o 
THE POLICY COMPLIANCE _ . . - Q 
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS p ^ ^ 
_ _ ^ — _ ^ 
C r 
t o i i u w l u w u" uri o£. u t c o c n m e n d c t i o n s by t h e UnltT^ 
E x e c u t i v e : 
~
 T
 ' " ^ i ^ . ^ c ; ^-. ^.L , ne a p p r o p r i a t e a c : „ c ; . t.-j b e 
i " , , a t e d by t h e U n i t E x e c u t i v e i n k e e p i n c w i t h t h e 
e s t a b l i s h e d t i m e t a b l e s . ~v e U n i t E x e c u t i v e s h a l l n -
a l t e r t h e . - t i r e - - ^ * - - . o u t c p r o v c i rf t h e ?CC; 
b . I f t h e PCC d e e s n o t a c o r o v e a n y o r G i, - <. 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , t h e U n i t E x e c u t i v e w i l l be r e q u i r e d 
t o d e v e l o p new a l t e r n a t i v e s a n d / r p r o v i d e a d d i t i o n a l 
f a c t s t o - u p p c - r t t h e o r i g i n a l p r o p o s a l , a n d s h a l l 
r e s u c m i t * n e s e c v - ~ " cr^p.^.M I S Q PCC ^ p c - ' n^ • 
.. o l l o w i n c ?CC a p p r o v a l - and - . - J : t n e c ^ r ^ c t e d 
i n d i v i d u a l s h a v e b e e n n o t i f i e a c t h e i r i m p e n d i n g 
s e p a r a t i o n a n d / c r d i s p l a c e m e n t , ^:he Human R e s o u r c e s 
D e p a r t m e n t may c i r c u l a t e a l i s t i n g i d e n t i f y i n g t h e s e 
i n d i v i d u a l s t o o t h e r D e p a r t m e n t s t o d e t e r m i n e i f an 
a p p r o p r i a t e p o s i t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e f o r ~ n i c h t h e y may 
b e c u a l i i - ' i ^ d and ~:z>~ld become c a n d i d a t e s ; ar,z* 
. • • « * ' - . D e c i s i o n s J - ....~ ..-•..' d - r i n a l ,;d c . 
o v e r r u l e d by t h e U n i t E x e c u t i v e . , b u t may ;e ^ : : e c l e d 
a s o r o v i d e d for r- ne acc^il r - o c e s r . 
I V • T h e a p p e a l p r o c e s s i s : : f ws : 
a , T h e U n i t E x e c u t i v e v . . . : ; i s*" t h e A .ppea l Board oc 
t h e i n t e n t t o a p p e a l t r .e ? "C •>,. - . : i s i c n tntf r e q u e s t •> 
m e e t i n g I" i 
* • P r e s e n t t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s a n a t c c i i n v o l v e d i n 
t h e p r o p o s e d a c t i o n s ^ s u b m i t t e d t o t h e PCC, s n d # 
*.. _ x p l a i n i t s o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e y^v^ Luj-inu and t h e 
r e a s o n s f o r r e q u e s t i n g a n e v i a t i o n f rom t h a t r u l i r . . . ; 
b . T h e PCC C h a i r p e r s o n s h a l l p r e s e n t t n e L a t i o r i a l e u s e d i n 
m a k i n g i t s d e c i s i o n , i n c l u d i n g a n y a l t e r n a t i v e s i t 
r e c o m m e n d e d ; 
c •. -L Lowing p r e s e n t a t i o n s by b o t h p a r t i e s , t h e A p p e a l 
H o a r d s h a l l r e n d e r i t s d e c i s i o n a n d s o a d v i s e t h e U n i t 
E x e c u t i v e and t h e PCC C h a i r p e r s o n , T h e Appea l B o a r d 
d e c i s i o n i s f i n a l . 
THE POLICY COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE 
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
. e r c u l e s - 1
 ; : ^ i ^ s t a n d a r d b e n e f i t s u ^ c e : : : - W 
d i s m i s s a l s a l a r y c l a n f o r a l l s e p a r a t e d erne l e v e e s 
H o w e v e r , a l l e m p l o y e e s w i l l be g i v e n a t l e a s t ' 2 5 d a y s 
n o t i c e , w h e t h e r e x e m p t c r n c n e x e m o t . 
CQE-A 
c- - - — - '- - — * - r - r . r e e f o r t h c s a ^ h o v-. ( •; • \ ? . o v e r s e e 
V I . C a r e e r Lone i u u a i i u u s e u v i c e s V J I I I Lie a v a i l a b l e t o a l l 
HEHCULES e m p l o y e e s who a r e p e r m a n e n t l y t e r m i n a t e d by 
t h e Company u n d e r t h e R e s i z i n g p r o g r a m , 
a , ^ e l e c t e d i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l r e c e i v e o n e - o n - o n e 
c o u n s e l i n g f o r up t o t h r e e m o n t h s , 
1
 . >. . LULU- exempt e m p l o y e e s w i l l ' b e p r o v i d e d a t h r e e 
i i r y w o r k s h o p , 
c i L Hi I e m p l o y e e s w i l l be p r o v i d e d a two d a y 
^ »nr ' , 
K-j.^  , L.'ie rarying levels of careen continuation recognize 
the complexity and length oc time necessary for new 
employment to be secured, 
V i , i ''-M-MTTNTr^rriNS : 
I t i s HhriCo^nc a >~-_: . z c.i-. . : : e : ; : c :. a<e t h e s e 
n e c e s s a r y , bur d r a m a t i c a o t i e n s in t h e most s e n s i t i v e ami 
p o s i t i v e manner p o s s i b l e under t h e e x i s t i n g 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . R e c o g n i z i n g t h a t r u m o r s and a v a r i e t y of 
m i s i n f o r m a t i o n w i l l abound c u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d , a 
c o n c e n t r a r e d e f f c r r w i l l be mace t o i n f o r m our e m p l o y e e s , 
a s w e l l as t h e communi ty , of t h e ' p l a n n e d w o r k f o r c e 
r e d u c t i o n s , t h e s e p a r a t i o n b e n e f i t s f o r which t h e 
t e r m i n a t e d employees a r e e l i g i b l e and t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of 
a C a r e e r C o n t i n u a t i o n program t o a s s i s t them in makir. z t h e 
t r a r f i 1 * 1 ^ to new c a r e e r / e m p lev—ent o p p o r t u n i t i e s . 
O 
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